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This research investigated two questions: How effective is the United States Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) when 
compared to its predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System? And, does NTAS 
provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? The research 
methodology/design used a comparative analysis of results observed for each system as it 
addressed the problem set presented in a case study. The research found that NTAS is 
effective but continued improvement is needed. 
These improvements include: the formal establishment of a DHS Office of 
Counterterrorism Coordination; the renewal of the DHS Counterterrorism Advisory 
Board Charter or other appropriate governance documents to ensure sustainment of 
necessary decision making and execution authority for NTAS; refine the NTAS Concept 
of Operations to better demonstrate the system’s scalable outcomes other than an NTAS-
generated alert, such as Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc.; 
NTAS-related outreach and education efforts with the homeland security enterprise and 
the public; and the improvement of communication aspects of NTAS integrating with 
other warning systems, such as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. These 
improvements are critical in sustaining the current effectiveness of the system and 
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Terrorism warning systems provide warnings for internal (organizational or for official 
decision makers) and external (other partner organizations or the public) categories of 
constituents. They must support resolution of the decision maker’s dilemma and balance 
between the need to warn people in danger from terrorism with the need to maintain 
operational security (OPSEC) for counterterrorism (CT) efforts to mitigate that danger. 
Therefore, a system is effective if it capably fulfills these two thematic functions related 
to providing warning and decision advantage. 
Determining the effectiveness of a seldom-used warning system, such as the 
National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS), is a difficult problem to solve. More 
difficult is determining the effectiveness of a warning system that seldom provides 
external warnings because it serves a complex community of both internal and external 
constituents. Another criterion of the effectiveness of a warning system is its ability to 
provide sufficient “decision advantage” to the decision makers it serves. The type of 
threats that terrorism warning systems are used for involves mitigating the additional 
complexity posed from thinking human adversaries. This additional complexity presents 
a challenge to homeland security officials in accomplishing the daily mission and also for 
any effort to evaluate a terrorism warning system with a quantitative approach. These 
factors mean that any examination of a terrorism warning system must qualitatively 
accommodate the complex warning community, determine the level of decision 
advantage it provides, and, in assessing system outcomes, incorporate the mercurial 
human nature of the threat. 
In response to the problem, this research compared the case studies of NTAS and 
its predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System. It included a brief 
contrast/comparison discussion between the tenets of a terrorism warning system, such as 
NTAS and the U.S. hurricane warning system (also known as the Tropical Cyclone 
Forecasting and Warning Program). This discussion of similar systems that address 
different threats provided important context for the NTAS effectiveness/decision 
advantage evaluation. A standardized panel of questions, Dr. Erik Dahl’s theory of 
 xiii 
preventive action, and Clayton Christensen’s resources-processes-values framework 
provided assessment tools to compare the effectiveness of these terrorism warning 
systems.1 These tools also were used to assess each system’s capability to deliver 
decision advantage. 
The research supported that NTAS is an effective system that provides a sufficient 
decision advantage capability. However, the system requires further improvements. 
These improvements involve: formally establishing a DHS Office of Counterterrorism 
Coordination; renewing the DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board Charter or other 
appropriate governance documents to ensure sustainment of necessary decision making 
and execution authority for NTAS; refine the NTAS Concept of Operations to better 
demonstrate the system’s scalable outcomes other than an NTAS-generated alert, such as 
Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc.; conduct NTAS-related 
outreach and education efforts with the homeland security enterprise  and the public; and 
improve communication aspects of NTAS integrating with other warning systems, such 
as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. These improvements are critical in 
sustaining the current effectiveness of the system and in ensuring its future success. 
  
1 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 175–184; Clayton M. Christensen, The 
Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book that Will Change the Way You do Business (New York: 
Harper Business, 2011), 185–197. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Throughout its history the United States devised various warning systems 
designed to provide people with sufficient warning to mitigate harm from hazards. 
Warning systems assist in protecting people from the harm posed by many hazards, such 
as fires, floods, blizzards, hurricanes, or attacks from other people; however, systems do 
not completely mitigate the dangerous effects from such hazards. For example, they do 
not artificially shield people from harm. Instead, through their warnings, these systems 
provide a “decision advantage,” allowing appropriate choices in advance of danger. 
The term “decision advantage” is commonly utilized within the United States 
Intelligence Community (IC) to describe the desired outcome of the intelligence process. 
Intelligence experts Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber define the concept: 
[Intelligence] officials do not value information according to the difficulty 
with which it was acquired, but according to its relevance and timeliness 
to the decision at hand. Their purpose is to gain “decision advantages” for 
political leaders, diplomats, military commanders, and other U.S. 
government officials in order to secure the country’s interests in both 
peace and war.1 
In a broader homeland security context, warning systems provide decision advantages to 
a large and diverse group of decision makers, from senior public officials to individual 
citizens. 
This thesis explores the usage of a terrorism warning system and the benefits of a 
system such as the current United States system the National Terrorism Alert System 
(NTAS). As the current NTAS coordinator, my hope is to provide the homeland security 
enterprise (HSE) partners and the American public with an opportunity to understand 
why and how NTAS functions as a key counterterrorism (CT) capability.2 
1 Jennifer E. Sims and Burton L. Gerber, Transforming US Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2005), 16. 
2 The author works in the DHS Office of the Counterterrorism Coordinator, as the National Terrorism 
Advisory System Coordinator. This office coordinates CT functions for the department and supports the 
DHS CT Coordinator in advising the DHS Secretary on CT issues and incidents. 
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The evaluation of the sufficiency of terrorism warning systems in providing 
effective warning and decision advantage presents a problem for every decision maker. In 
the HSE, this is the collection of decision makers or groups from the individual citizen up 
to the most senior policy maker.3 This problem manifests differently based upon the 
decision maker’s context. For example, a senior policy maker may evaluate a system’s 
effectiveness in order to determine if the system remains viable or needs revision. 
Alternatively, an individual citizen may evaluate effectiveness from a perspective of trust 
or confidence; in other words, would the citizen take action based on a warning from that 
system? 
From the popular perspective, the NTAS may suffer from a lack of public 
confidence like its color-coded predecessor, the Homeland Security Advisory System 
(HSAS), but for a diametrically different reason.4 The HSAS suffered overexposure and 
poor utilization, which diminished its public confidence level and its effectiveness as a 
decision advantage tool.5 On the other hand, NTAS has never been publically utilized 
and no warnings have been disseminated outside government circles. This means it does 
not have a track record of reliability and broad understanding in the public purview. This 
situation creates a potential credibility gap—just when the public will most need the 
decision advantage this type of system purportedly provides. Therefore, a fresh look is 
warranted to determine the value of NTAS. A conceptual measurement framework 
assessing the NTAS capability to provide decision advantage and warning provides the 
basis for making an effective evaluation. 
3 According to DHS, “The QHSR identifies the importance of what we refer to as the homeland 
security enterprise—that is, the Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector 
entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities who share a common national interest in the 
safety and security of America and the American population.” Department of Homeland Security, 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 
iii.   
4 NTAS is supposed to sustain the public trust and confidence, “A system in which the American 
public can have confidence….” Executive Office of the President, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-7 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 2011). 1. 
5 This body was tasked by DHS Secretary Napolitano to evaluate the effectiveness of HSAS and 
provide recommendations for improving the nation’s advisory system capability. Homeland Security 
Advisory Council, Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force Report and Recommendations 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009). 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question for this thesis is: How effective is the NTAS when 
compared to its predecessor the HSAS? A secondary research question is: Does NTAS 
provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Since its inception in April 2011, NTAS has not released a public alert or received 
any substantial public mention for its role in supporting CT efforts. But despite the lack 
of publicly visible output from NTAS or any publicity for its role in the supporting 
broader CT efforts, it is a system that has been frequently used within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) due to its ability to provide effective warning and decision 
advantage.6 
This potential public confidence gap generates the need for more research in order 
to better determine and ensure the effectiveness of NTAS. The diminished public 
awareness of NTAS usage stems from the fact that NTAS more often supports internal 
government CT decision making and information sharing. This type of internal NTAS 
support produces a plethora of other derivate decision support products or warnings, such 
as Joint Intelligence Bulletins (JIBs), etc. that are not inherently designed for public 
consumption like an NTAS generated public alert.7 
Therefore, a different research approach from previous research that assessed 
NTAS is needed to answer the primary and secondary research questions.8 This research 
6 Press statements from former DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano and congressional testimony from 
former DHS Counterterrorism Coordinator Rand Beers reflect this level of usage during timeframes of 
increased vigilance, such as the 2011 Bin Laden Raid timeframe or more recently, during domestic 
incidents, such as the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing. 
7 According to Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, “The JIB provides timely 
information or analysis on a recent or current event or development of interest to all information and 
analysis customers and is produced at various classification levels. They deal with counterterrorism, 
homeland security, and WMD-related information. It focuses on Homeland Security issues, is written on an 
ad hoc basis, and is generally one to three pages. It is available to members of the HSE depending on the 
classification of the information.” Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, Intelligence 
Guide for First Responders, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination 
Group, 2011), 29.   
8 Vincent H. Sharp, “Faded Colors: From the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to the 
National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS)” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 1. 
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approach defines the tenets of an effective terrorism warning system and nuances of the 
terrorism threat such a system addresses. It also discusses the characteristics of two 
different threat types, deliberate and non-deliberate. This research presents a threat 
assessment methodology and the role of threat assessment in supporting CT efforts. It 
discusses the decision maker’s dilemma, which arises when considering the use of a 
terrorism warning system. This discussion provides perspective for why such as system 
can remain invisible to the nation it serves. 
This research serves to examine and present an improved understanding for the 
mechanics of a terrorism warning system. This is achieved through the validation or 
invalidation of the hypothesis that the NTAS provides an improved system in support of 
CT decision making, coordination and communication.9 
D. METHOD 
This body of research provides an operating definition of two different threat 
types, deliberate and non-deliberate respectively. It discusses the dilemma any decision 
maker faces in situations prompting the use of a terrorism warning system. It presents the 
debate about the efficacy of terrorism warning systems in the context of broader U.S. 
government (USG) CT approaches. It also contextually supplies the tenets of an effective 
warning system with a comparison between the United States hurricane warning system 
and the current terrorism warning system NTAS. 
The HSAS and NTAS represent the two United States terrorism warning systems. 
Each of these systems supplies a case study for a structured focused comparison designed 
to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Each system is assessed through 
a panel of questions within each system’s respective case study chapter. In the analysis 
chapter, these systems are compared and contrasted with one another using these 
questions. For additional evaluation, each system is analyzed with at least one other 
9 The NTAS replaced the color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). This new system 
“effectively communicates information about terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to 
the public, government agencies, first responders, airports and other transportation hubs, and the private 
sector.” Department of Homeland Security, NTAS Public Guide, April 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/ntas-
public-guide 
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theory. Based on the outcomes of this analysis, the conclusion chapter presents findings 
and recommendations as well as other potential considerations related to NTAS or the 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is paucity of literature specifically addressing NTAS or its effectiveness. 
Although there is not a large amount of NTAS specific research, reviewing the broader 
body of homeland security literature related to other warning systems supplies a basic 
understanding for how warning systems fulfill their role in homeland security. What 
follows is a summary of this review. It includes a discussion of deliberate and non-
deliberate threat types, the decision maker’s dilemma when considering the use of a 
terrorism warning system and a presentation of important elements of the warning 
systems. After discussing these topics, a synopsis of the professional discourse amongst 
detractors and supporters of terrorism warning systems follows as well as the presentation 
of a potential alternative approach for the current terrorism warning system, NTAS. 
The U.S. hurricane warning system (HWS) is included in this literature review for 
contrast and comparison with the two terrorism warning systems. This comparison 
provides important context from the perspective of a more publically well-known and 
reliable warning system because as Congressman Chris Shays pointed out: 
When a blizzard or hurricane is forecasted, the public is not advised to be 
brave for America and stay in the eye of the storm, but when the threat of 
terrorism is elevated, citizens are advised to go about their lives as if no 
real peril approached. We need to make terrorism alerts at least as targeted 
and accurate as storm projections.10 
A. THREAT TYPES—DELIBERATE AND NON-DELIBERATE 
Presenting these two threat types, non-deliberate and deliberate, supports of the 
discussion of terrorism warnings more thoroughly later in this literature review. 
According to Dr. David Alderson, “non-deliberate risk is akin to ‘mother-nature’ or a 
random occurrence of threat, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, etc. Deliberate 
10 Homeland Security Advisory System: Threat Codes and Public Responses: Before the House of 
Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, 
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong., 2 (2004) (statement of General Patrick Hughes, Assistant 
Secretary for Information Analysis).  
 7 
                                                 
threats are generated from an ‘enemy.’”11 The important distinction is between naturally 
occurring (non-deliberate) versus human generated (deliberate) threats. Deliberate human 
threats are more dynamic due to the human attacker’s capability to think and counter 
move against defensive efforts, such as terrorism warnings. This distinction of threat 
types is a fundamental frame of reference in properly understanding the consistent 
reasons for outcomes derived from different types of warning systems. The threat a 
warning system addresses is directly related to the demonstrated outcomes of that system. 
A non-deliberate threat, such as a hurricane, is a more obvious type of danger than 
that of terrorism. This is due to the reality that a hurricane is a force of nature and is not a 
thinking enemy. It is not attempting to gain the element of surprise with stealthy tactics. 
A hurricane does not maintain a sense of purpose in its actions. It does not seek to enact 
political change through acts of violence. It forms and travels wherever the winds and 
seas take it. It does not knowingly change its course in purposeful attempt to deceive or 
sow confusion amongst forecasters and first responders in order to achieve a more 
horrific impact on the communities it affects. 
However, a hurricane is similar to an act of terrorism in two factors: it does instill 
fear in a community and can devastate that community with its violence. The threat 
assessment process for a non-deliberate threat type is much more predictable and rote. 
The severe weather and warning system expert, Mike Smith provides this simple bulleted 
list regarding hurricane warning and mitigation process phases: 
• The forecast, 
• Action taken to protect life (evacuation) and property (boarding-up), and 
• The post-storm aftermath and recovery.12 
Smith further details the steps the HWS follows in providing warnings: 
The first step in making a forecast is to locate any hurricanes or tropical 
storms already in existence. The second step is to forecast their future 
path. The third is to forecast their changes in intensity. Once the changes 
11 David Alderson, “Risk and Critical Infrastructure Systems: Practice and Pitfalls” (presentation, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, October 2013). 
12 Mike Smith, Warnings: The True Story of how Science Tamed the Weather, 1st ed. (Austin, TX: 
Greenleaf Book Group Press, 2010), 205. 
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in intensity (which meteorologists define in terms of atmospheric pressure 
and wind speed) are complete, other vital forecasts such as rainfall 
amounts and storm surge can be made. Then, the final forecast is 
communicated to the NWS field offices and local emergency management 
officials so evacuations and other preparatory actions can begin.13 
In summary, predictability is the central difference between a non-deliberate 
threat type, like a hurricane, and a deliberate threat type, such as terrorism. Hurricanes 
present a more persistently obvious danger to the public and do not create a decision-
making dilemma for an official charged with warning anyone about this type of danger. 
There is no doubt about the need to warn anyone in the path of a hurricane. 
This is not necessarily the case with the dangers terrorism presents the decision-
making official. The deliberate threat type of terrorism is difficult to discern and predict. 
Framing the concept of threat and how to assess the threat posed from a deliberate 
thinking adversary is important context. David Strachan-Morris examines this issue 
presents a framework for defining and assessing a deliberate type of threat. His efforts 
draw from amongst the combined military and homeland security doctrine of major 
Western nations, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, etc.14 His 
analysis assists in defining threat and its subordinate elements in order to frame the 
discourse of whether the terrorism threat is exaggerated or not. 
Strachan-Morris supplies a methodology for evaluating the deliberate threat type. 
According to Strachan-Morris, “Simply put, threat is a function of capability and 
intent.”15 If an adversary maintains both the capability and intent to cause harm they are 
a threat. Depending on the assessment of the adversary’s capability and intent we can 
gauge the level of threat that adversary poses. In addition, Strachan-Morris also points 
out, “Intent can be broken down into two further components, will and opportunity.”16 
Evaluating the adversary’s previous attacks and public statements together produces an 
13 Ibid. 
14 David Strachan-Morris, “Threat and Risk: What is the Difference and Why does it Matter?” 
Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 2 (2012): 174. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 175. 
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assessment of the adversary’s will to attack. Determining the opportunity variable for an 
adversary represents assessing the “level of opportunity available to an organization” to 
conduct an attack.17 For example, “an organization that can attack whenever and 
wherever it wants has a high level of opportunity.”18 Therefore, threat assessment is a 
function of an adversary’s level of capability and its intent to cause harm. If an adversary 
maintains sufficient capability and intent (will and opportunity), then that adversary poses 
a threat. Intelligence and CT professionals utilize threat assessment as the basis and 
substance for providing warning. If the threat assessment and warning are timely and 
effective, they provide decision advantage to senior officials or other decision makers. 
This decision advantage can lead to successful actions mitigating the adversary’s threat. 
The deliberate threat problem set a terrorism warning system addresses boasts 
additional complexities that are not existent in other non-deliberate threat problem sets 
faced by the HWS. The terrorism warning system must carefully balance the need to 
warn communities to potential danger against the need for operations security (OPSEC) 
inherent to CT efforts attempting to keep those same communities safe. Balancing the 
need to warn and the need for OPSEC is the crux of the CT decision maker’s dilemma. 
B. DECISION MAKER’S DILEMMA 
The terrorism warning system decision maker faces a two-fold dilemma. A 
decision maker must avoid creating undue fear, anxiety, and/or confusion amongst those 
receiving a terrorism warning. The decision maker must also ensure OPSEC for ongoing 
CT efforts. In 2007, the United States Army released a new regulation defining OPSEC: 
OPSEC is not traditional security, such as information security like 
marking, handling and classifying information; it's not the physical 
security of actually protecting classified information though they're all 
related and part of OPSEC. OPSEC is different from traditional security in 
that we want to eliminate, reduce and conceal indicators, unclassified and 
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid.  
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open-source observations of friendly activity that can give away critical 
information.19 
This perspective provides the working definition of OPSEC for this research effort. 
The complete absence of an OPSEC consideration is one major difference 
between the HWS and any terrorism warning system. Without this OPSEC consideration, 
there is no dilemma. The warning deliberation is reduced to a simple discussion of when 
and how to warn people most effectively. It is not encumbered with a deliberation of “if” 
a warning is appropriate and whether that warning degrades efforts to stop the threat. 
Human operations cannot stop the forces a hurricane; however, human operations can 
stop the human threat of a terrorist attack. Therefore, an OPSEC deliberation is a major 
differentiation between a non-deliberate threat decision to warn and a deliberate threat 
decision to warn. 
In addition to OPSEC considerations, terrorism warnings should not create undue 
fear or panic for the public. Psychological fatigue could result from undue fear or panic. 
This fatigue can degrade the benefits of a terrorism warning about the threat, such as a 
heightened level of public vigilance. Poorly utilized terrorism warnings can also 
desensitize the public to the danger posed from the terrorist threat. Rose McDermott and 
Philip Zimbardo reflect this phenomenon in the story of the boy who cried wolf: 
We all know from the classic story of the boy who cried wolf, after only 
three false alarms, people cease to take seriously the validity of previously 
credible messages. Indeed, they come to dismiss such warnings fairly 
quickly over time because they prove to be inaccurate; when warning 
comes without anything happening afterward, people lose faith in the alert 
system itself.20 
It is important to avoid raising unnecessary public distress, which achieves the 
same affect the terrorists are striving for: instill fear. This is the additional negative 
outcome McDermott and Zimbardo note with this comment, “Mismanaged alarm 
procedures do the terrorists work for them.” As McDermott and Zimbardo point out, 
19 J. D. Leopold, “Army Releases New OPSEC Regulation,” U.S. Army, April 19, 2007, accessed 
September 4, 2014, http://www.army.mil/article/2758/army-releases-new-opsec-regulation/  
20 Bruce Bongar et al., eds, Psychology of Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 360.  
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avoiding these negative impacts requires an effectively managed decision-making 
process. Additionally, a designated body or group of decision makers increases the 
sustainability and consistency in this decision making process. 
To address both aspects of this decision-making dilemma, a well-managed and 
deliberate process is needed. For sustainability and consistency in this decision-making 
process, a designated body or group of decision-makers is advisable. 
C. TENETS OF WARNING SYSTEMS 
As noted, warning systems provide an opportunity for people to avoid danger. 
What follows is a presentation of the important elements each system requires to 
effectively accomplish its purpose. For contrast and comparison reasons, the HWS is 
reflected first in this review, with the terrorism warning system following immediately 
afterward. 
1. Tenets of a Hurricane Warning System 
The essential tenets of a HWS are very similar to a warning system focused upon 
terrorism, tenets that are covered later in the Tenets of a Successful Terrorism Warning 
System section in this literature review. These HWS tenets provide context for 
comparison with the terrorism warning system. The HWS is “an interdepartmental effort 
to provide the United States and designated international recipients with forecasts, 
warnings, and assessments concerning tropical and subtropical weather systems.”21 The 
purpose of the system is: “Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisories [hurricane warning 
system]…provides critical tropical cyclone watch, warning, and forecast information for 
the protection of life and property.”22 The HWS tenets are more defined and specific 
because it is more scientific and established due to the frequency of its use over the 
course of the last 100 years. Additionally, this system is maturely established amongst the 
21 Participating organizations, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
of the Department of Commerce; the United States Navy of the Department of Defense; and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. Department of Commerce, Office of the Federal Coordinator for 
Meteorological Services and Supporting Research, National Hurricane Operations Plan (FCM-P12-2013) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2013), 1-1. 
22 Ibid., 3-2. 
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interdepartmental partners that operate the HWS. This maturity is reflected in the 
operations plan governing and synchronizing the partners, “The National Hurricane 
Operations Plan [that] provides the basis for implementing agreements…defines the roles 
of individual agencies, participating in the tropical cyclone forecasting and warning 
program [hurricane warning system]….”23 
Below are important tenets that the HWS employs to effectively warn and provide 
decision advantage to those under hurricane threat: 
1. The HWS must provide timely weather forecasts through the Tropical 
Cyclone Discussion product. This product “provides coordinated 12-, 24-, 
36-, 48-, 72-, 96-, and 120-hour tropical cyclone forecast positions and 
maximum sustained wind speed forecasts; other meteorological decisions; 
and plans for watches and warnings.”24 
2. The system must provide watches and warnings of possible hurricane 
conditions within 48 hours and expected hurricane conditions within 36 
hours. 
3. The system must provide updates of any significant changes to the 
conditions of the situation in between regularly scheduled public 
advisories, such as “…the time and location of [hurricane] landfall, or to 
announce an expected change in [hurricane] intensity that results in an 
upgrade or downgrade of status, [etc.].”25 
These HWS tenets are similar to the tenets of the terrorism warning system. In contrast, 
the HWS is very defined and predictable because it addresses a defined and predictable 
non-deliberate or non-thinking threat. In other words, a hurricane does not deliberately 
change its course or its make-up (wind speed, size, etc.) in order to counter the hurricane 
forecaster’s storm predictions or the first responder’s preparations for storm impacts. 
2. Tenets of a Successful Terrorism Warning System 
Establishing the essential tenets of a terrorism warning system is important in 
order to assess the efficiency or effectiveness of NTAS. These tenets are more an art form 
than a well-practiced science represented in the HWS tenets. This generates the need for 
a composite sketch of terrorism warning system tenets drawn from terrorism experts, 
23 Ibid., 1-1. 
24 Ibid., 3-2. 
25 Ibid., 3-2. 
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government officials and other respected sources from among the relevant discourse 
community. This composite sketch includes a central task in addition to the tenets of a 
terrorism warning system. 
a. The Central Task 
Beginning the discussion of the terrorism warning system’s purpose or central 
task, Jacob Shapiro and Dara Kay Cohen state, “An effective terrorism alert system has 
one central task: to motivate actors to take costly protective measures.”26 Shapiro and 
Cohen further offer how such a system accomplishes this central task, “the government 
can share specific information to motivate protective action, or it can generate enough 
confidence in the alert system that its word alone sufficiently increases actors’ beliefs 
about the probability of an attack that they willingly take the desired actions.”27 
Moreover, Dr. James Breckenridge underpins the importance of confidence as a matter of 
trust: “Trust is the essential component to the success of any…system. Perfect messaging, 
color codes, or adjective threat advisories will not be effective without the public’s 
confidence in the system and those delivering the message.”28 Furthermore, in 
congressional testimony, DHS Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, 
Robert Jensen articulated confidence and trust as a DHS priority, “During an incident… 
[one of] our communications priorities [is]…. Employment of risk communications and 
transparency to gain and maintain public confidence and trust….”29 Based upon this, it is 
apparent that confidence in the warning system is a key feature in accomplishing the 
system’s central task of motivating individuals to take action in safeguarding themselves. 
26 Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara Kay Cohen, “Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security 
Advisory System,” International Security 32, no. 2 (2007): 121.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Stakeholder Feedback Report (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009).     
29 Why Can’t DHS (Homeland Security Department) Better Communicate with the American People?: 
Before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management 
Efficiency, 113th Cong., 6 (2013) (statement of Mr. Robert Jensen, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security).  
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b. Important Tenets of a Terrorism Warning System 
What follows is a list of the important tenets of a terrorism warning system. These 
tenets are distilled from the myriad of views within the discourse community regarding 
terrorism warning systems. They generally describe the critical elements of a warning 
system in accomplishing its central task and importantly, in engendering or maintaining 
confidence and trust in the system.30 
1. A terrorism warning system should provide timely detailed information 
regarding the threat. 
2. A terrorism warning system should provide clear and understandable 
protective actions or other mitigation measures. 
3. A terrorism warning system should provide a clear duration for the period 
of threat. 
4. A terrorism warning system should be agile in its ability to raise or lower 
the threat level in keeping with the conditions of the threat situation. 
5. A terrorism warning system should provide effective decision advantage 
to the people receiving the information. 
These terrorism warning system tenets are similar to the tenets of the HWS. The 
contrast from the HWS resides in applying these terrorism warning system tenets to the 
thinking human threat. Therefore, a terrorism warning system is more of an art than a 
science, because a terrorist does deliberately change attack plans, such as tactics, 
techniques and procedures in order to counter the intelligence analyst’s threat warnings or 
the CT professional’s preparations to prevent the attack or mitigate its impacts. The 
terrorism warning system is defined and predictable to a degree; however, it must remain 
flexible in addressing a more vague and deliberate or thinking threat. 
30 Ibid; James J. Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman, “The Current Threat Level: Ending Color-Coded 
Terror Alerts,” Memo #3068, November 30, 2010, The Heritage Foundation, accessed March 15, 2014, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/11/the-current-threat-level-ending-color-coded-terror-
alerts?ac=1; William O. Jenkins, Homeland Security Advisory System: Preliminary Observations 
Regarding Threat Level Increases from Yellow to Orange (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 
2004); Sharp, “Faded Colors;” Homeland Security Advisory Council, Homeland Security Advisory System; 
Homeland Security Advisory Council, HSAS Survey Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009); Executive Office of the President, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-7; House 
of Representatives. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 
Threats, and International Relations, Homeland Security Risk Communication Principles May Assist in 
Refinement of the Homeland Security Advisory System, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony Randall Yim), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/110679.html 
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3. Terrorism Warning System Detractors 
Three general elements comprise the detractors’ argument against the need for a 
terrorism warning system. The first element is that the terrorism threat is exaggerated or 
poorly represented to the average citizen. This frequency related argument represents the 
central building block of the detractors’ case. The second element is that heightened 
vigilance from terrorism warnings is overrated. The third element of the argument deems 
terrorism warnings as a driver of unnecessary economic burden. 
a. The Exaggerated Terrorism Threat—The Main Opposing Argument 
The exaggerated terrorism threat is the detractors’ main argument. Varied 
opinions exist concerning the value of terrorism warnings and the need for the USG level 
of effort put in to countering terrorism in general. Many government officials and 
terrorism experts argue that the terrorist threat to American citizens remains significant. 
But some experts, such as John Mueller and Mark Stewart, argue the threat is 
exaggerated and not as dire as some expert opinions assert: “the exaggerations of the 
threat presented by terrorism [result in] the distortions of perspective these exaggerations 
have inspired.”31 
Using 9/11 as a common frame of reference, most detractors focus on the 
radicalized Islamist variety of terrorist. The detractors’ main argument rests on the low 
occurrence of successful terrorist attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001. 
This is also the strongest and most easily understood argument detractors employ. For 
example, Shikha Dalmia provides a profile of a successful would-be terrorist operating in 
the United States: 
[R]adicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move 
around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in 
31 Mueller and Stewart represent the halyards of dissenting opinion regarding the real level of 
terrorism threat and in proposing alternatively appropriate levels of effort for homeland security efforts in 
general. They are cited often in this thesis, because they have conducted exhaustive analysis toward 
determining the real level of threat from terrorism. Subsequently, their articles and books present a 
comprehensive compendium of evidence collected from the discourse community of dissenting opinions 
about the level of threat the United States faces from terrorism. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “The 
Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11,” International Security 37, no. 1 
(2012): 83.   
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the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad 
logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to 
make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them 
away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—
psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without 
cracking in the face of their own impending death.32 
Based on this daunting profile of a terrorist recruit Dalmia presents, it is not surprising 
that detractors believe the terrorist threat overblown. Finding a recruit meeting these 
requirements would be very difficult, which makes the argument seem reasonable. 
Reinforcing this frequency argument, Mueller and Stewart point out, “In all, 
extremist Islamist terrorism—whether associated with al-Qaida or not—has claimed 200 
to 400 lives yearly worldwide outside of war zones. That is 200 to 400 too many, of 
course, but it is about the same number as bathtub drowning every year in the United 
States.”33 
Testing the detractors’ frequency-based argument with Strachan-Morris’s threat 
methodology, Islamist terrorist adversaries rate very high in the will aspect of intent. This 
is due to their rhetoric and track record of attacks or attempted attacks. Although high in 
the will component, these terrorists seem low in the opportunity component. They appear 
at least moderately capable. However, they are restricted in opportunity due to their 
arsenal of conventional weapons, such as mortars, small arms, etc. as well as in their 
tactics, such as complex small arms attacks and suicide vest equipped bombers. 
Additionally, these terrorists are not located in close geographic proximity to the United 
States and do not appear to possess the capability to overcome this challenge of distance. 
This cursory threat assessment is supported by Mueller and Stewart, “…Islamist 
militants…are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making 
mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.”34 This assessment 
32 Shikha Dalmia, “What Islamist Terrorist Threat? Al Qaeda Doesn’t Have What it Takes to Hurt 
America,” February 15, 2011, accessed July 4, 2014, http://reason.com/archives/2011/02/15/what-islamist-
terrorist-threat  
33 Mueller and Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion.” 
34 Ibid., 89. 
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seems to support the detractors’ argument for an acknowledgement that the terrorism 
threat is lower than many would accept as true. 
The detractors’ frequency argument also cites the lack of positively identified 
terrorists or terrorist plots discovered from CT efforts as proof the terrorism threat is 
overstated. Mueller and Stewart submit, “Although the thousands of al-Qaida operatives 
once thought to be flourishing in the United States were never found, there have been 
efforts to make that delusion more fully fit reality.”35 The detractors’ posit this continued 
overstatement of the terrorism threat then perpetuates a widespread delusion similar to 
the “Red Scare” phenomenon and the infamous McCarthy Trials of the 1950s.36 In this 
sense, detractors are questioning the motives of government officials and other supporters 
who present the terrorism threat as an imminent danger to the public. Therefore, 
detractors portend that supporters are utilizing a false argument about the dire threat from 
terrorism in order to justify their continued efforts and expenditures of resources. 
b. Overrated Benefit of Heightened Public Vigilance—A Supporting 
Argument 
Detractors present that there is little real benefit from raising threat awareness 
amongst the public. Benjamin Friedman asks and answers, “Does exhorting the public to 
be vigilant add a layer of defense against terrorism that justifies the anxiety and false 
leads it causes? I…argue that the answer to all these questions is no…vigilance is 
overrated.”37 In a sense, Paul Pillar concurs with Friedman and bemoans, “The 
35 Ibid. 
36 According to History.com, “As the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States 
intensified in the late 1940s and early 1950s, hysteria over the perceived threat posed by Communists in the 
U.S. became known as the Red Scare. (Communists were often referred to as ‘Reds’ for their allegiance to 
the red Soviet flag.) The Red Scare led to a range of actions that had a profound and enduring effect on 
U.S. government and society. Federal employees were analyzed to determine whether they were 
sufficiently loyal to the government, and the House Un-American Activities Committee, as well as U.S. 
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, investigated allegations of subversive elements in the government and the 
Hollywood film industry.” “Red Scare,” accessed July 7, 2014, http://www.history.com/topics/cold-
war/red-scare  
37 Benjamin H. Friedman, “Do Terrorism Warnings Work?” The National Interest [blog], October 13, 
2010, accessed April 5, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/do-terrorism-warnings-work-
4214  
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uselessness to the public of…vague official alerts about possible terrorist attacks in 
Europe….”38 Pillar further states:  
Our government [United States] told us not that we should revise our 
travel plans but that we should take sensible precautions such as being 
aware of our surroundings. Sounds like standard advice for any foreign 
traveler, terrorist threat or no terrorist threat. The public consequently is as 
bemused as it was by those stoplight charts about levels of terrorist threat 
for which the former homeland security czar Tom Ridge was criticized 
when he introduced them.39 
There are some grounds for belief that the public is conditioned to ignore 
terrorism warnings as the HSAC Task Force concluded, “The Task Force members 
agreed that, at its best, there is currently indifference to the Homeland Security Advisory 
System and, at worst, there is a disturbing lack of public confidence in the system.”40 
These points encapsulate this aspect of the detractor argument that the purported value of 
increase public vigilance is overrated in countering acts of terrorism. 
c. Unspecific Warnings Drive Unneeded Costs—Another Supporting 
Argument 
Another aspect of the detractor argument emphasizes the unnecessary costs from 
terrorism warnings as a reason for doing away with terrorism warnings. At a minimum, 
detractors desire to improve terrorism warnings in order to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiencies of actions taken by those responding to them. The detractors point out that a 
terrorism warning system suffers this foible: unspecific terrorism warnings drive 
unneeded costs. In making this supporting argument, detractors hope to diminish warning 
related costs that do not productively assist warning recipients in their response efforts to 
any threat. 
38 Paul R. Pillar, “What Terrorism Alerts Say about Ourselves,” The National Interest [blog], October 
7, 2010, http://nationalinterest.org/node/4193 
39 These comments are in response to the September 2010 Department of State travel alert regarding a 
threat from terrorism for citizens travelling to or within Europe. Paul R. Pillar, “What Terrorism Alerts Say 
about Ourselves.” 
40 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Homeland Security Advisory System, 1. 
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If the frequency argument is accepted as valid in determining the risk posed from 
terrorism, Howard Kunreuther is correct in asking, “How much should we be willing to 
pay for a small reduction in probabilities that are already extremely low?”41 According to 
Mueller and Stewart, “Since September 11, expenditures in the United States on domestic 
homeland security alone…have expanded by more than $1 trillion.”42 Under the old 
HSAS, Dana Priest and William Arkin note, Americans received “a steady diet of vague 
and terrifying information from national security officials” and have “shelled out 
hundreds of billions of dollars to turn the machine of government over to defeating 
terrorism without ever really questioning what they are getting for their money.”43 
Detractors point out that costs related to terrorism warnings are expensive. One 
estimate placed the cost of alerting the public under the HSAS at approximately $1 
billion per week each time the alert level was raised to orange.44 According to DHS, this 
type of alert level change occurred eight times, lasting approximately 31 total weeks, 
between 2002 and 2011.45 If the $1 billion per week cost is valid, this totals a cost of $31 
billion due to alerting alone. According to Priest and Arkin, “Factoring in the additional 
costs incurred by state and local governments—and the potential economic losses from 
reductions in consumer confidence, travel, and tourism—only makes the cost of this 
imperfect system [HSAS] more exorbitant.”46 In the following statement from Carafano 
and Zuckerman effectively concludes this aspect of the detractor argument, “Without 
specific information as to the nature of the threat, states and localities are forced to decide 
between piling on expensive (and potentially unnecessary) layers of security and doing 
nothing at all.”47 
41 Howard C. Kunreuther, “Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain World,” Risk 
Analysis 22, no. 4 (2002): 662–663.  
42 John E. Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, 
and Costs of Homeland Security (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2011), 1–3. 
43 Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security 
State (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2011), xviii–xix, 103. 
44 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The Current Threat Level: Ending Color-Coded Terror Alerts.” 
45 Department of Homeland Security, “Chronology of Changes to the Homeland Security Advisory 
System,” accessed July 29, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-advisory-system  
46 Carafano and Zuckerman, “The Current Threat Level: Ending Color-Coded Terror Alerts.” 
47 Ibid.  
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4. Terrorism Warning System Supporters 
Conversely, supporters of robust CT efforts, such as terrorism warning systems, 
posit three general arguments that correspond or counter the arguments of the detractor 
community. The thrust of these arguments is that the United States should maintain a 
prudent acknowledgement of the terrorism threat, heightened vigilance is beneficial, and 
increased security outweighs the increased security costs. 
a. Prudent Acknowledgement of Terrorism Threat 
Acknowledgement of the threat of terrorism to the United States and its citizens is 
prudent. As counterinsurgency/counterterrorism expert James D. Kiras suggests, “The 
most important phase of any counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign is 
recognizing that the threat exists.”48 Terrorism expert Seth Jones of the RAND 
Corporation presents stark findings concerning the sustained and potentially growing 
threat of terrorism to the United States. In a 2014 report, Jones’ research denotes a 58 
percent increase in the number of Salafi-Jihadist terrorist groups since 2010, which 
comprises a combined force numbering between 40,000 to upwards of 100,000.49 
Although these groups are geographically distant to the United States, located in the 
Middle East and North Africa, they desire to attack Western nations in Europe as well as 
in North America. Using David Strachan-Morris’s threat assessment method, these 
groups demonstrate significant intent and capability. Among these Salafi-Jihadi groups 
Jones cites is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).50 ISIS demonstrates a resolute 
will toward violence and a capability to create attack opportunities, which makes ISIS 
and groups like them, acutely more deadly. Therefore, ISIS and other kindred groups, 
represent a real threat for conducting terrorist attacks against their enemies, such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, etc. 
48 John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary World: An 
Introduction to Strategic Studies, 4th ed. (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2013), 184. 
49 Seth G. Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qaida and Other Salafi-Jihadists (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), 26–28. 
50 Ibid., 3. 
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Clearly detractors such as Mueller and Stewart, make their case essentially 
utilizing the low frequency of terrorism as a bulwark for their argument. It seems 
reasonable to consider if something should be treated as a great threat, if it does not occur 
very often. Mueller and Stewart cite David Banks to assist people in prudently drawing 
“the distinction between realistic reactions to plausible threats and hyperbolic 
overreaction to improbable contingencies.”51 Yet, this frequency argument advances a 
tenuous premise: people should be willing to adjust their security prioritization levels 
based upon mere chance that a terrorist attack will not happen to them or at least, affect 
them in some manner. In 2013 congressional testimony, noted terrorism expert Bruce 
Hoffman articulates the hazard of this tenuous premise,  
Finally, the continued absence of a successful, major al Qaeda attack in 
North America since 2001 may induce a period of quiet and calm that lulls 
us into a state of false complacency, lowering our guard and, in turn, 
provoking al Qaeda or one of its allies to chance a dramatically 
spectacular attack in the U.S.52 
In keeping with the lull Professor Hoffman identifies, the 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombing directly contradicts the detractors’ frequency argument because “…the Boston 
Marathon bombings serve as a reminder that threats from terrorism persist and continue 
to evolve.”53 Furthermore, a 2013 Pew Research Poll reflected that since the attacks of 
9/11, the public has consistently remained at least somewhat concerned about terrorism.54 
This level of concern never dipped below 58 percent of the population over the 12 year 
period between 2001 and 2013.55 David Lauter expressed the American citizen’s support 
51 Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money, 28. 
52 Testimony Presented before U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, 
Assessing Attacks on the Homeland: From Fort Hood to Boston, 113th Cong., 2013, 7 (testimony of Bruce 
Hoffman), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20130710/101108/HHRG-113-HM00-Wstate-
HoffmanB-20130710.pdf 
53 Mike Levine and Lee Ferran, “Boston One Year Later: DHS’s Lessons Learned,” ABC News [blog], 
April 10, 2014, accessed May 2, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/04/boston-marathon-
bombing-homeland-securitys-lessons-learned/   
54 Michael Dimock, Carroll Doherty, and Alec Tyson, Most Expect ‘Occasional Acts of Terrorism’ in 
the Future: Six-in-Ten Say Post-9/11 Steps have made Country Safer (Washington, DC: Pew Research 




                                                 
for CT efforts, “The survey…showed that 60 percent of Americans say they think the 
government actions taken since Sept. 11, 2001, have made the country safer; 35 percent 
disagreed.”56 Since CT efforts attempt to provide a safer community from the impacts of 
terrorism, this poll effectively strengthens the argument for CT efforts like a terrorism 
warning system. It also counters and diminishes the detractors’ arguments that terrorism 
is an exaggerated concern out of step with America’s more pressing concerns, such as the 
United States economy or domestic public policy issues. 
b. Heightened Vigilance Beneficial 
Supporters of increasing vigilance believe in the inherent deterrent benefit of an 
alert HSE actively participating in security. Therefore, heightened vigilance is beneficial. 
The power of teamwork in defeating terrorism is central to the supporters’ argument 
regarding vigilance. The importance of vigilance is reflected in this comment from the  
[Former British] MI5 chief Jonathan Evans signaled that the service wants 
to raise public vigilance to the terrorist threat, and to stress that 
intelligence agents alone cannot solve the Islamist extremist 
problem…[because] this is not a job only for the intelligence agencies and 
police.57  
Former DHS Secretary Napolitano echoed this position, “As I said, this new National 
Terrorism Advisory System is built on the common-sense belief that we are all in this 
together, and that we all have a role to play.”58 
There are community based programs that provide programmatic evidence 
supporting the heightened vigilance argument. In keeping with the emphasis on a team 
approach toward homeland security efforts, engendering assistance from the community 
or other non-traditional partners for providing effective public safety is not a new 
56 David Lauter, “Poll: Terror Acts ‘Part of Life’ in America,” Spokesman Review (Spokane, WA), 
April 24, 2013, sec. A. 
57 Mark Rice-Oxley, “Home-Grown Terrorist Recruitment Rising, Says British Spy Chief,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 2007. 
58 “Written Testimony of Department of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano for a Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary Hearing Titled ‘The Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,”’ April 25, 2012, 
Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/04/25/written-testimony-department-
homeland-security-secretary-janet-napolitano-senate      
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approach. For decades the community-oriented policing (COP) model has performed a 
very similar function. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) defines the COP 
model,  
Community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational 
strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-
solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that 
give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of 
crime.59  
The DOJ also notes that this model promotes teamwork, “Community policing, 
recognizing that police rarely can solve public safety problems alone.”60 
Suspicious activity reporting (SAR) programs also present evidence that 
heightened vigilance helps counter terrorism. Programs such as, the DHS “If You See 
Something; Say Something” campaign and the National Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Initiative (NSI) are examples that diminish the effectiveness of the detractors’ argument 
about vigilance. These programs are nationwide and provide a pathway for information 
about suspicious activity to officials. It is sometimes difficult to quantify how programs 
such as this directly mitigate or counter acts of terrorism. 
However, a 2010 Institute for Homeland Security Solutions report provides some 
sense as to the SAR impact. This report, “examines open-source material on 86 foiled and 
executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine the types of 
information and activities that led to (or could have led to) their discovery.”61 Scott 
Erickson and Matt Mayer of the Heritage Institute examined the report and drew the 
following conclusion, “A well-informed and capable infrastructure of law enforcement 
personnel, coupled with a vigilant citizenry, has proven to be an important shield against 
the machinations of diverse and disparate groups of organizations and individuals with 
59 Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Community Oriented 
Policing Defined (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2009), 1. 
60 Ibid., 5. 
61 Kevin Strom, Building on Clues Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999–
2009 (Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010), 25. 
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terrorist inclinations.”62 This was based upon their analysis of the following report 
findings: 
The report collated and analyzed 86 terror plots through the 10-year period 
of January 1, 1999, to December 31, 2009, 18 of which were executed. 
Each of the 68 failed plots analyzed had a nexus to terrorism, the majority 
of which were related to al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda-associated movements 
(AQAM), or al-Qaeda–inspired incidents (often committed by the 
proverbial “lone wolf” terrorist). Revealingly, over 80 percent of the 68 
thwarted cases were the subject of full criminal investigations that resulted 
from the initial observations of federal, state, and local law enforcement 
officers conducting routine police work, and through the vigilant 
observations of the public. Reports of suspicious activity, tips from the 
public, and the investigation of seemingly unrelated “ordinary” criminal 
activity accounted for a substantial number of lead-ins to full 
investigations that would ultimately frustrate the terrorist intentions of 
those apprehended.63 
This analysis provides strong evidence of the deterrent effect of heightened vigilance and 
it is clearly beneficial in support of CT efforts. 
c. Increased Security Outweighs the Increased Mitigation Costs 
Supporters present evidence that increased security outweighs the increased 
mitigation costs. The detractors presented a figure of $1 trillion as the cumulative security 
cost over the period of the past decade since the 9/11 attacks. However, this figure is 
counterbalanced with staggering short and long-term costs incurred by the attacks on that 
single day. A 2009 report compiled by three Federal Reserve Bank researchers finds that 
the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City resulted in the following:  
The total physical capital loss was estimated to be $21.6 billion and the 
lifetime earnings loss was estimated to be $7.8 billion, yielding a total 
estimated loss of $29.4 billion ($2001)…. Over this period [2001-2006] it 
62 Jason Bram, Andrew Haughwout, and James Orr, “Further Observations on the Economic Effects 
on New York City of the Attack on the World Trade Center,” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public 
Policy 15, no. 2 (2009):1 1–22, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/a-comprehensive-
suspicious-activity-reporting-sar-system-requires-action 
63 Scott Erickson and Matt Mayer, A Comprehensive Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) System 
Requires Action (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2012). 
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is estimated that [lost] wage and salary income was roughly $6 billion 
($2006).64  
The staggering magnitude of these costs, incurred from one coordinated terrorist attack, 
comprises a strong argument in the supporters’ calls for security spending sufficient to 
prevent another occurrence. 
Furthermore, an assessment conducted of homeland security spending for the 
period of 2001–2005 concluded, “Given the modest increase—as well as the robust 
economic performance of the U.S. economy since 2001—we conclude that the broader 
economic impact of higher security spending has been very limited.”65 Moreover, this 
sum could be considered a security-related maintenance cost in order to avoid another 
successful terrorist attack or attacks accumulating the costs of United States blood and 
treasure on the scale of 9/11. The cost consequences of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
combined with the limited impact of security related spending, present the fundamental 
core of the supporters’ counterargument for the detractors’ claims of overspending.  
If a straightforward cost-based counterargument is insufficient, supporters present 
the chilling facts of the 9/11 attacks expressed in more kinetic terms.  
Between the jets, the fuel, and the kinetic force of the collapsing World 
Trade Center buildings, the southwestern tip of Manhattan had been struck 
with a force estimated at twice the size of the smallest U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapon.66  
Supporters also remind us of other horrific acts of terrorism, such as the July 7, 2005 
London bombings, or the March 11, 2004, Madrid Train bombing. Sometimes the 
terrorists themselves weigh in to this cost argument with a cold reminder in the form of a 
successful attack, such as the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. This aspect of the 
supporters’ argument is not expressed with financial or economic terms. This aspect of 
the supporters’ argument is a sobering reminder of the very real catastrophic impacts 
64 Bram, Haughwout, and Orr, “Further Observations on the Economic Effects.” 
65 Bart Hobijn and Erick Sager, “What Has Homeland Security Cost? An Assessment: 2001–2005,” 
Current Issues in Economics and Finance 13, no. 2 (2007): 2.  
66 Linda Rothstein, “After September 11,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57, no. 6 (2001), 44.  
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from just one successful terrorist attack. This type of reminder makes the more theoretical 
and statistical frequency argument of the detractors diminished in effectiveness. 
5. Terrorism Warning System Alternative 
Other current terrorism warning system research presents at least one alternative 
to NTAS, “[A] merger of HSAS with [the Department of Defense Force Protection 
Conditions (FPCON)] would provide one credible and recognizable viable system.”67 
This alternative concept advanced the argument that the well-recognized system of HSAS 
alert levels combined with a more prudent use and communication of those levels 
through the FPCON methodology supplies a more effective national system. According 
to Sharp,  
The easy color-coding recognition of HSAS combined with the threat 
levels and established measures in the FPCON system are a match that 
should be implemented to provide federal agencies, the industrial sector, 
and the general public with the best threat advisory system.68  
This alternative integrates the color codes with military terminology. This does 
not sufficiently address the issues of providing specific detailed warning and in 
improving the diminished level public confidence and trust. These are significant issues 
noted in the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) Task Force Report as well as 
in other numerous expert criticisms of what the United States terrorism warning system 
should address. This alternative approach does not effectively address the central task and 
supporting aspects of an effective terrorism warning system presented earlier in this 
chapter. Subsequently, this alternative does not answer the need for an improved 
terrorism warning system. 
6. Theories Supporting Warning System Evaluation 
The literature review also revealed theories directly related to evaluating decision 
making regarding both deliberate, such as terrorism. The “preventive action theory” 
67 Information in brackets provides clarification for the author’s use of FPCON acronym in the 
original text. Sharp, “Faded Colors,” 5–6. 
68 Ibid., 66. 
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directly applies to assessing decision making efforts in preventing terrorism. Dr. Erik 
Dahl’s preventative action theory supplies an important framework in understanding the 
interaction between the decision-makers and those charged with supplying them with the 
decision support materials.69 It is essential in understanding the decision advantage value 
between the two terrorism warning systems. This is a great approach for capturing the 
difficulties inherent with a decision regarding a deliberate threat type such as terrorism. 
Complementing the preventive action theory, “resources-processes-values” (RPV) 
framework provides another assessment structure sufficient to address both the 
similarities between the warning systems as well as their differences. Although 
Christensen originally applied RPV to the business world, it effectively allows evaluation 
of the elements of each warning system and then supports comparison of these elements 
amongst the systems.70 
 
69 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and 
Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).  
70 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book that Will Change the 
Way You do Business (New York: Harper Business, 2011), 185–197. 
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III. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM  
This chapter provides the background of HSAS. The process portion of this 
chapter discusses how HSAS was utilized. HSAS is then presented through a case study. 
An assessment of the system follows the case study, which utilizes a standardized panel 
of questions as well as the preventive action theory and the RPV framework. Finally, a 
conclusion is drawn about HSAS before transitioning to case study discussion of NTAS. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Understanding HSAS, even its problems, provides solid context for assessing 
whether NTAS is the solution to the failures of this original advisory system. On March 
11, 2002, President George W. Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/HSPD-3, creating a graduated threat advisory system to alert government 
authorities at all levels, as well as the American people, concerning the risk of terrorist 
attacks. HSAS was the “system of record” outlined in HSPD-3, with aspects amended by 
subsequent policy and statute.71 The HSAS consisted of five levels, ranging from the 
lowest threat level, “green,” to the most severe, “red.” The movement from one threat 
level to another resulted in the modification of activated protective measures and security 
posture. The HSPD-3 identified the Attorney General as having primary responsibility for 
the HSAS; however, this was altered by later policy and statute. 
Both HSPD-5 as well as the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA 2002), section 
203, (as amended by the 9/11 Act) named the Secretary of DHS as having primary 
responsibility to administer the HSAS. Section 203 directed the Secretary to develop a 
HSAS that was more comprehensive than that of HSPD-3, in that DHS was directed to 
establish criteria and methodology for the issuance and revocation of advisories; develop 
the content of these advisories; develop targeted advisories for specific regions, localities 
or economic sectors; and go beyond a simple color-coded system to advise of threats. 
71 Executive Office of the President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-3 (Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2002). 
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B. HSAS PROCESS 
Pursuant to HSPD-3 and as clarified later in HSPD-5, HSAS level changes were 
decided through a less defined and rather inconsistent decision-making process,  
Except in exigent circumstances, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
seek the views of the Attorney General, and any other federal agency 
heads the Secretary deems appropriate, including other members of the 
Homeland Security Council, on the Threat Condition to be assigned.72  
The distribution of alert/warning information was also less defined:  
The Secretary shall ensure that, as appropriate, information related to 
domestic incidents is gathered and provided to the public, the private 
sector, State and local authorities, Federal departments and agencies, and, 
generally through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, to 
the President.73 
Even with HSPD-3 and the clarification provided in HSPD-5, making HSAS 
changes and communicating them was not a science but more of an art form. This created 
great difficulty in consistently conducting HSAS decisions and notifications. In 2004, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted an investigation into HSAS in an 
effort to understand the process and present potential recommendations for improvement. 
As lead for one of these investigations, Randall Yim stated in testimony to the United 
States Congress, “They [DHS officials] said no explicit criteria or other quantifiable 
factors are used to decide whether to raise or lower the national threat level.”74 In a 
related GAO report, “DHS officials told us that they have not yet formally documented 
protocols for notifying federal, state, and local government agencies of national threat 
level changes.”75 This lack of consistent process violated GAO guidance regarding 
72 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5: Management of Domestic 
Incidents (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), in Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States: George W. Bush, 229–234, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book1/html/PPP-
2003-book1-doc-pg229.htm 
73 Ibid. 
74 House of Representatives. Committee on Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Homeland Security Risk Communication Principles May 
Assist in Refinement of the Homeland Security Advisory System, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony Randall 
Yim), http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/110679.html 
75 Jenkins, Homeland Security Advisory System, 8–9. 
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internal controls for government agency operations, “For an entity to control its 
operations, it must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to internal 
as well as external events.”76 
A cumulative conclusion drawn from the multiple studies of HSAS is that the 
decision-making process for HSAS was convoluted, lacked transparency, and engendered 
little public trust.77 The convoluted nature of HSAS and its lack of public trust are 
exemplified in a comment from an HSAS risk communications respondent to DHS in 
August 2009: 
Consistently, citizens from my community will ask me what are the trigger 
points, or bench marks to change the color, but more importantly, what 
actions should they be taking in their personal lives should that threat level 
change? Unfortunately, I can’t give them any real clear guidance.78 
The HSAC Task Force Report further highlighted the need for improved 
transparency with the Task Force receiving input such as: 
We also noted that 41% of citizen respondents to the DHS HSAS website 
cited the lack of specificity in the current HSAS process as a major 
concern. This reinforces the need for communicators to be advocates of 
transparency, as threats and as any new threat advisory system is 
developed and presented to our citizens.79 
As reflected in the numerous reports and studies cited thus far, HSAS did not 
maintain any tenet of an effective terrorism warning system. It did not provide timely 
detailed threat information, nor did it provide clear and understandable protective actions. 
In addition, it did not provide a clear duration of a period of threat. Finally, it was not 
consistent in changing the color-code levels. It did not provide decision advantage. 
76 General Accounting Office, Internal Control Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government (Washington, DC, General Accounting Office, 1999). 
77 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Stakeholder Feedback Report, 15; Homeland Security 
Advisory Council, HSAS Survey Report; Homeland Security Advisory Council, Homeland Security 
Advisory System. 
78 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Stakeholder Feedback Report. 
79 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Homeland Security Advisory System, 23. 
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C. CASE STUDY: 2009 “CHRISTMAS DAY BOMBING” 
After more than six years of HSAS, these combined factors of systemic 
ineffectiveness resulted in a widespread loss of confidence in the system. HSAS was so 
ineffective that it was not central in addressing a clear incident of terrorism in December 
2009.80 The 2009 Christmas Day bombing case study illustrates this assessment. 
The 2009 Christmas Day bombing case is also known as the “Underwear 
Bomber” case thanks to the incorporation of an improvised explosive device (IED) into a 
pair of underwear worn by the convicted terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab in his 
attempt to blow up Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit. According to the report from the 
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) Northwest 
Flight 253 carried 290 passengers and crew.81 If his attack had succeeded, it could have 
resulted in the death of the 290 people onboard and in an untold number of others—
depending on the location over which this attack occurred. This case study reflects the 
HSAS role in dealing with a terrorist attack. As previously discussed, HSAS suffered 
from a lack of confidence and ineffectiveness from the lack of a defined or focused 
process. The results of this are readily apparent in how the USG did not utilize HSAS in 
addressing the Christmas Day bombing incident in 2009. 
As noted, the ICPVTR conducted an analysis and compiled a report of the events 
leading up to the incident as well as the attack itself. According to this report,  
In August 2009, Abdulmutallab visited his hometown in Abuja, Nigeria 
and is said to have spent two weeks there before going to Yemen…it was 
during this time there [Yemen] that he became a full-fledged radicalized 
extremist.”82 There, known terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, completed 
80 Ineffectiveness due to HSAS failure to accomplish the mandated requirements noted earlier in this 
chapter: HSA 2002, Section 203 required the secretary to develop a HSAS that was more comprehensive 
than that of HSPD-3, in that DHS was directed to establish criteria and methodology for the issuance and 
revocation of advisories; develop the content of these advisories; develop targeted advisories for specific 
regions, localities or economic sectors; and go beyond a simple color-coded system to advise of threats. 
81 Diane Russel and Ong Junio, Report on the Attempted Bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 
‘Christmas Bombing Plot’ (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, 2010). 
82 Russel and Junio, Report on the Attempted Bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253,’ 5. 
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Abdulmutallab’s recruitment, selection and preparations for a “martyrdom 
mission.83 
On December 7, 2009, after completing necessary preparations in Yemen, Abdulmutallab 
transited through Ethiopia to Ghana. On December 16, he purchased, with cash, a round-
trip plane ticket to Detroit, Michigan that included a connection through Amsterdam. He 
flew to Nigeria on December 24 and began his flight to Detroit, which ultimately 
culminated in his failed bombing attempt. 
During the period when Abdulmutallab was in Yemen,  
The suspect’s own family had some concerns with his behavior. Sometime 
in November 2009 (approximately four weeks before the attempted 
bombing), Dr. Mutallab [Abdulmutallab’s father] told the United States 
Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, about his concerns for his son’s religious 
beliefs.84  
The White House review report of this incident confirmed this communication with the 
embassy occurred on November 18.85 The ICPVTR report noted, “The information was 
passed on to U.S. intelligence agencies, which placed Abdulmutallab’s information in…, 
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) database, which is managed by the 
U.S. National Counterterrorism Center.”86 According to NCTC.gov: 
TIDE is the U.S. Government’s (USG) central repository of information 
on international terrorist identities. The TIDE supports the USG’s various 
terrorist screening systems or ‘watchlists’ and the U.S. Intelligence 
Community’s overall counterterrorism mission. This information is 
available to counterterrorism professionals throughout the Intelligence 
Community, including the Department of Defense, via the web-based, 
read-only ‘TIDE Online.’87 
83 Ed White, “Feds Release New Details about Underwear Bomber,” The Washington Times, February 
10, 2012. 
84 Russel and Junio, Report on the Attempted Bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253, 6. 
85 “Summary of the White House Review of the Details of the December 25, 2009 Attempted Terrorist 
Attack,” 2009, Federal Depository Library Program, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS118485  
86 Russel and Junio, Report on the Attempted Bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253, 6. 
87 National Counterterrorism Center, "Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment Fact Sheet," National 
Counterterrorism Center, August 1, 2014, http://www.nctc.gov/docs/tidefactsheet_aug12014.pdf  
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This fact is key because it represented a missed opportunity for intelligence and 
CT professionals to possibly prevent the attack. The availability of this information, 
combined the lack of analysis to understand what it meant, provided one of the most 
vexing points of frustration. 
This failure to secure the American people created great frustration in every part 
of the HSE and American public. Senator Joseph Lieberman gave voice to the broad level 
of frustration this case generated regarding the systemic failures in homeland security: 
In the Christmas Day bombing case, there was so much intelligence and 
information available to our government that pointed to Abdulmutallab’s 
violent intentions that it is beyond frustrating—it is infuriating—that this 
terrorist was able to get on that plane to Detroit with explosives on his 
body. He was able to do so, in sum, as President Obama has correctly said, 
because of systemic failures and human errors.88 
The White House review of the incident stated, “Unfortunately, despite several 
opportunities that might have allowed the CT community to put these pieces together in 
this case…that was not done.”89 
The White House review revealed,  
The most significant failures and shortcomings that led to the attempted 
terror attack fall into three categories: 
• A failure of intelligence analysis, whereby the CT 
community failed before December 25 to identify, 
correlate, and fuse into a coherent story all of the discrete 
pieces of intelligence held by the U.S. Government related 
to an emerging terrorist plot against the U.S. Homeland 
organized by al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
and to Mr. Abdulmutallab, the individual terrorist. 
• A failure within the CT community, starting with 
established rules and protocols, to assign responsibility and 
accountability for follow up of high priority threat streams, 
run down all leads, and track them through to completion; 
and 
88 Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Intelligence 
Reform, 2010 Hearings before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United 
States Senate, 111th Cong. (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56838/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg56838.pdf  
89 “Summary of the White House Review of the Details of the December 25, 2009,” 1. 
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• Shortcomings of the watchlisting system, whereby the CT 
community failed to identify intelligence within U.S. 
government holdings that would have allowed Mr. 
Abdulmutallab to be watchlisted, and potentially prevented 
from boarding an aircraft bound for the United States.90 
The report also points out that the difficulties and failures of the “Christmas Day 
bombing” differ from those of the attacks on 9/11. According to the “Summary of the 
White House Review,” “Previously [during 9/11] there were formidable barriers to 
information sharing among departments and agencies…. [The Christmas Day bombing] 
problem appears to be more about a component failure to ‘connect the dots,’ rather than a 
lack of information sharing.”91 This conclusion indicates a lack of coordination of efforts 
and not only a lack of information sharing amongst intelligence and CT officials. 
The congressional testimony from the first DHS CT Coordinator, Rand Beers, 
highlights the absence of an HSAS capability to provide a methodology supporting CT 
coordination and decision making: 
Following the attempted attack on December 25, 2009, Secretary 
Napolitano assigned me [DHS CT Coordinator, Rand Beers] an additional 
duty within the Department to improve coordination among the 
operational components and to bring together the policy and intelligence 
components to support this effort. As the Department’s Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, I am responsible for coordinating all counterterrorism 
activities for the Department and across its directorates, components, and 
offices related to detection, prevention, response to, and recovery from 
acts of terrorism.92 
The creation of the CT Coordinator role reflects the management/coordination 
gap HSAS represented among decision makers in DHS. This appointment of a CT 
Coordinator demonstrated DHS Secretary Napolitano’s solution to the need for a senior 
decision maker/manager was needed. This appointment and the chartering of the DHS 
Counterterrorism Advisory Board (CTAB) in November 2010 addressed the management 
90 Ibid., 2. 
91 Ibid., 2–3. 
92 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Ten Years After 9/11: Preventing 
Terrorist Travel: Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs 
Committee, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Mr. Rand Beers, Under Secretary for the National Protection 
and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security), 122–150, 449, 593. 
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gap and lack of a designated decision making body for HSAS. These were gaps that 
existed in HSAS since its establishment. However, the Christmas Day bombing presented 
a more glaring indictment of HSAS. Since August 2006, the HSAS threat level was 
“high” or orange specifically for the aviation sector. Despite this fact, Abdulmutallab 
successfully boarded a plane and came very close to successfully conducting a terrorist 
attack. 
The HSAS did not play a central role in dealing with this situation, as evidenced 
in the fact that there was no warning provided through a color code change for aviation. 
According to the historic DHS timeline of HSAS level changes, there was not even an 
announcement reiterating the importance of security measures consistent with the 
existing threat level. The fact that even at the point of a terrorist attack, HSAS remained 
an inert system speaks volumes in regards to its effectiveness and the level of confidence 
it enjoyed. HSAS was not used to communicate any information regarding this terrorist 
attack. It remained static at level orange for aviation, even after the attack. In fact, HSAS 
had not changed at all for three years. Although the color code was at orange at the time 
for the aviation sector, this was due to a thwarted threat to aviation in 2006 and had 
nothing to do with the 2009 Christmas Day bombing threat.93 
D. CASE STUDY ASSESSMENT 
Table 1 reflects the outcome of examining HSAS with the standard panel of 
questions. The problems are apparent. HSAS did not provide a consistent methodology 
for terrorism warnings nor did it provide a system HSE decision makers at every level 
could have confidence in. However, over its lifetime, HSAS did maintain a certain level 
of heightened vigilance/visibility to the threat of terrorism. Even if, toward the end of that 
lifetime, this vigilance and visibility was more often in the form of jibes on late night talk 
shows. 
 
93 Department of Homeland Security, “Chronology of Changes.”  
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Table 1.   HSAS Assessment Panel Responses 
HSAS Assessment Panel Answer Explanation 
Management of system established? No No formal management system was ever established. 
Was management of system sustained, 
durable, and effective? No 
 
Was there a defined decision making 
process utilized to reach a decision? No 
No defined decision making process was utilized. 
Was the decision-making process 
sufficiently effective? No 
Several cited reports, testimony and assessments 
provide evidence that HSAS supported decision 
making was ineffective. 
Was the decision making process 
sustainable in providing a repeatable 




Was the decision making process 
timely in supporting the situation? No 
 
Was the decision making process 
sufficiently adaptable to provide 
effective decision support for 





Was there a decision making body 
designated to make this decision? No 
Presidential Directives named cabinet level officials 
responsible for collaborating on these decisions. 
However, no formal decision making body was 
chartered. 
Was it necessary for a designated 
decision making body to exist? Yes 
This presented a major gap in HSAS. The 
successful application of a designated body in 
support of NTAS provides evidence of how 
detrimental this gap was for HSAS. 
Was there a defined convening 
process for gathering the decision 
makers together? 
No 
Several cited reports and assessments note the lack 
of defined process for HSAS. 
Was this convening process timely 
and sustainable when the situation 
required multiple decisions over the 
course of extended periods? 
No 
Several cited reports, testimony and assessments 
provide a cumulative picture of the lack of 
sustainability and timeliness in HSAS supported 
decision making. 
Based upon the outcome of the 
original decision, was the decision 
making process sufficient in supplying 
decision advantage to subsequent 
decision makers dealing with the 
situation? 
No 
Cited reports, testimony and assessments note that 
the HSE at large was often confused by HSAS 
decisions. This created cascading failures in 
decision making at every level of the HSE. 
Was this system the only or principal 
decision support pathway through 
which the decision reached decision 
makers? 
No 
This system was not the only or even principal 
system toward the end of its service life.  
Did the system support original and 
secondary decision makers? No 
Note the previously mentioned cascading failures in 
decision making throughout the HSE. 
Did the system support coordination 
of efforts dealing with the situation? No 
According to cited reports, testimony and 
assessments support for coordination was 
inconsistent at best. 
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HSAS Assessment Panel Answer Explanation 
If supporting coordination of efforts, 
how did the system work effectively? No 
 
Was there a designated 
communication method for the 
dissemination of the decision? 
Yes 
Color coded alert levels represented the principle 
communication method. 
Was the decision communicated 
effectively? 
Yes 
Color coded alerts minimally communicated threat 
level changes. However, as noted in reports and 
testimony, these color code changes were neither 
well detailed nor contained enough specificity for 
decision makers to effectively utilize. 
 
1. Standard Panel of Questions Examination 
There was a failure to build a repeatable and durable warning and decision 
support methodology in HSAS. This is represented in the failure to accomplish the 
mandated requirements noted earlier in this chapter: HSA 2002, Section 203 required the 
secretary to develop a HSAS that was more comprehensive than that of HSPD-3. 
Specifically, DHS was directed to establish criteria and methodology for the issuance and 
revocation of advisories; develop the content of these advisories; develop targeted 
advisories for specific regions, localities, or economic sectors; and go beyond a simple 
color-coded system to advise of threats. 
The complete absence of HSAS in the management of the Christmas Day 
bombing incident is telling. At the time of this failed attack in 2009, HSAS was 
peripheral and of marginal value. The color codes did not change even though this was a 
clear terrorist incident, which is a clear indication of its ineffectiveness. Even the official 
White House summary report for the incident did not mention HSAS, instead focusing 
upon other aspects of the IC and the CT communities of the United States.94 It had truly 
become an inert system in need of change. As Shapiro and Cohen concluded, “Given the 
failure of the HSAS, the time has come to take on the challenge of creating a better 
system.”95 
94 “Summary of the White House Review of the Details of the December 25, 2009.” 
95 Shapiro and Cohen, Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security Advisory System, 154. 
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2. Theory of Preventive Action 
An assessment of HSAS with the preventive action theory reveals critical 
shortcomings that generated a clear lack of trust in this system. HSAS lacked a defined 
repeatable decision making process. A consistently receptive decision-making body 
designed to function strictly in a CT capacity did not exist for HSAS. This lack of a 
consistent decision-making process and designated CT decision-making body played a 
role in the mercurial results of the HSAS. Directed in HSPD-3 and HSPD-5, the decision 
makers consisted of a small group of the most senior policymakers in the USG, the 
President of the United States, the Attorney General, and the DHS Secretary. The level of 
HSAS usage over the course of its history from 2002–2011 demonstrates a clear 
fluctuation in decision-maker receptivity and confidence in HSAS. From its inception in 
March 2002 until August 2006, 16 changes to the color codes occurred. However, during 
the last year of the Bush administration no changes occurred. What is particularly telling 
is that after the presidential administration transition in 2008, HSAS remained inert until 
its replacement by NTAS in April 2011. This is despite at least two clear terrorist attacks 
occurring after transition, the 2009 Najibullah Zazi and Christmas Day bomber terrorist 
incidents. This demonstrates a clear degradation of decision makers’ confidence for 
HSAS. 
It also consistently failed to provide a reliable pathway for detailed and timely 
information in support of senior decision-makers’ needs. Consequently, this lack of trust 
impaired decision making at all levels of the HSE, which in turn, sowed a great deal of 
confusion amongst the members for the HSE in coordinating, communicating, or 
executing appropriate countermeasures. This means HSAS never consistently provided 
strategic warning or successfully addressed the paradox of strategic warning.96 As a 
result, HSAS did not consistently provide decision advantage to HSE decision makers. 
96 This paradox contributes to the likelihood terrorist attacks succeed, because decision makers lack 
the type of detailed timely information necessary to prevent a terrorist attack. 
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3. RPV Framework 
The HSAS did not succeed in its intended mission due to repeated missteps that 
degraded confidence in the system over time as well as significant organizational design 
flaws. HSAS suffered from the lack of an effective management system, a haphazard 
methodology and lack of defined decision making values. This hampered the consistency, 
sustainability and organizational focus in HSAS performance. 
In accordance with the numerous studies of HSAS reflected in this chapter, HSAS 
did not have a management system or designated body. It did not have organized 
resources, defined processes, or established decision making values. Unlike its successor 
NTAS, the DHS CTAB and the CT Coordinator did not manage HSAS until its last 
months of existence. There was no defined process, such as the NTAS Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) or other supporting documents, such as the DHS CTAB Charter. 
This meant there was no defined set of organizational values. This is important as the 
RPV framework points out, “An organization’s values are the standards by which 
employees make prioritization decisions.”97 The collected organizations attempting to 
make an HSAS decision or comply with the outcomes of an HSAS decision lacked the 
ability to anticipate these decisions or interpret how to effectively respond to them. This 
continually hampered HSAS performance and continued the degradation of confidence 
members of the HSE maintained in the system. 
According to the RPV framework, an organization that relies solely on the 
competency of the individuals operating a system without the benefit of a defined process 
is doomed to fail. Christensen explains this maxim of the RPV framework in this way,  
Frequently, they [the organization] assume that if the people working on a 
project individually have the requisite capabilities to get the job done well, 
then the organization in which they work will also have the same 
capability to succeed. This often is not the case.98  
Due to a lack of management, defined process and organizational values, the 
HSAS relied too heavily on individual performances in order to accomplish the collective 
97 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 188.   
98 Ibid., 185. 
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organizational mission of HSAS. This resulted in the outcome Christensen forecasts for 
any organization or system overly reliant on individual performance, repeated failure. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
As reflected in the case study and the numerous reports and studies cited thus far, 
HSAS did not maintain any tenet of an effective terrorism warning system. 
Unfortunately, it did not provide timely detailed threat information, nor did it provide 
clear and understandable protective actions. It did not provide a clear duration of a period 
of threat. Furthermore, it was not consistent in changing the color-code levels. 
Additionally, it did not provide decision advantage. After over six years of using HSAS, 
these combined factors of systemic ineffectiveness resulted in a widespread loss of 
confidence in the system. This ineffectiveness resulted in the continued marginalization 
of HSAS as a terrorism warning system. HSAS was so ineffective that it was not central 
in addressing a clear incident of terrorism in December 2009. 
Subsequently, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano was already considering major 
changes in the advisory system as well as the decision-making process it supported. The 
ineffectiveness of HSAS during the 2009 Christmas Day bombing incident galvanized 
the DHS Secretary’s considerations for changing the system. What resulted was a sea 
change for how DHS conducted CT decision making, coordination, and communication 
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IV. NATIONAL TERRORISM ADVISORY SYSTEM 
The NTAS is the current United States terrorism warning system. The United 
States DHS maintains responsibility for NTAS. This chapter provides background 
sketching out the path of how the United States adopted NTAS. The process portion of 
this chapter discusses how NTAS is utilized. NTAS is then presented through a case 
study of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. An assessment of the system follows the 
case study, which utilizes a standardized panel of questions as well as the preventive 
action theory and the RPV framework. Finally, a conclusion is drawn about NTAS before 
transitioning to a case study discussion of the HWS. 
A. BACKGROUND 
On July 14, 2009, DHS Secretary Napolitano announced the formation of a 
HSAC Task Force to conduct a 60-day review of the HSAS. This task force, co-chaired 
by Fran Townsend and William Webster, consisted of a group of highly respected experts 
in the field. On September 15, 2009, this task force submitted its report through the 
HSAC.99 This report included the following bulleted list of 
observations/recommendations: 
• Enduring Merit of a Dedicated Terrorism Advisory System: In the view of 
the Task Force, a national threat warning system for terrorist attacks is as 
central now as it was when today’s system [HSAS] was established in 
2002. 
• Two Audiences—The Public and “Institutions”: The Task Force members 
agreed that there are two primary audiences for the Homeland Security 
Advisory System. 
• The Current Advisory System—Commanding Insufficient Public 
Confidence: The Task Force members agreed that, at its best, there is 
currently indifference to the [HSAS] and, at worst; there is a disturbing 
lack of public confidence in the system. 
• Changing the Alert Level Baseline to Guarded Status: In the judgment of 
the Task Force, a central undermining feature of the current alert system is 
that the threat level more easily moves up than comes down. 
99 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Homeland Security Advisory System. 
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• Greater Precision is Required in Identifying the Specific Local 
Governments, First Responders and Private-Sector Companies Threatened 
and the Protective Measures that Necessitate a Response: The Task Force 
believes the cost in dollars—and skepticism—of overly broad alerts is a 
substantial problem requiring remedy. 
• The [HSAS] Will Require Dedicated Infrastructure, Staff, Established 
Protocols and Procedures: The Task Force believes the Secretary should 
establish the protocols, procedures, and the staff capable of supporting the 
Secretary.100 
Based upon the recommendations of the HSAC Task Force, DHS worked toward 
developing the next variation of a national advisory system throughout 2010. In January 
of 2011, the president signed Presidential Policy Directive-7 (PPD-7), which superseded 
HSPD-3, established NTAS and replaced HSAS. The president directed the Secretary of 
DHS to implement NTAS within 90 days from the signing of PPD-7; this was 
successfully accomplished on April 26, 2011. 
In addition to establishing a new terrorism advisory system, former DHS 
Secretary Napolitano concurrently chartered the DHS CTAB and the position of the DHS 
CT Coordinator. The DHS CTAB fulfills the 9/11 Commission recommendation for DHS 
to 
regularly assess the types of threats the country faces to determine (a) 
adequacy of the government’s plans to protect America’s critical 
infrastructure; and (b) the readiness of the government to respond to 
threats that the United States might face.101  
It does both by providing DHS a senior decision-making body, which reviews 
terrorism threat information and strategically coordinates the department’s CT efforts in 
response to those threats. In doing so, the DHS CTAB lives up to another 9/11 
Commission concept of “joint action” within government.102 
100 Ibid., 1–4. 
101 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2004), 428. 
102 Ibid., 400. 
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B. NTAS PROCESS AND THE ROLE OF THE DHS CTAB 
As discussed earlier, NTAS is designed to provide a decision advantage to a large 
and diverse group of decision makers, from senior public officials to the individual 
citizen. The NTAS process is a repeatable deliberate methodology that functions with 
sufficient agility to address routine CT issues as well as the emergent high tempo of 
surprise terrorist attacks. This agility is demonstrated in its support for the DHS CT 
Coordinator and DHS CTAB. The NTAS process guides the timing and sequencing of 
DHS CT Coordinator and DHS CTAB strategic decision making and coordination 
activities enabling tactical level success during periods of routine activity and incidents. 
As Chapter III notes, the DHS CT Coordinator and the DHS CTAB represent a 
dramatic improvement in timely and deliberate decision making at the strategic level. Mr. 
Rand Beers testified to the full breadth of this CT participation/coordination: 
In November 2010, DHS stood up the Counterterrorism Advisory Board 
(CTAB) to further improve coordination on counterterrorism among DHS 
components. As the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, I serve as the chair 
of the CTAB with the Under Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and 
the Assistant Secretary for Policy supporting the Board as Vice Chairs. 
Members include the leadership of TSA, CBP, ICE, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, USCIS, the 
United States Secret Service, NPPD, and OPS. The DHS General Counsel 
serves as legal advisor to the CTAB and is present at all meetings.103 
Each member of the DHS CTAB pools its pertinent information and intelligence about a 
CT issue in order to develop a focused cogent common knowledge base of the issue. This 
shared situational awareness supplies decision advantage in affording these leaders a 
tactically informed capability for strategic decision making, coordination, and 
communication. 
This CT coordination approach addresses a paradox revealed in Dr. Erik Dahl’s 
preventative action theory, which is a major contributing factor in failures to prevent acts 
103 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Ten Years after 9/11. 
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of terrorism.104 Dr. Dahl refers to this major contributing factor as the paradox of 
strategic warning.105 This paradox contributes to the likelihood terrorist attacks succeed 
because decision makers lack the type of detailed timely information necessary to prevent 
a terrorist attack. Through the NTAS process, the DHS CTAB provides a forum for 
decision makers to receive sufficient details in order to plan, coordinate and execute 
timely CT countermeasures. 
In congressional testimony, Beers laid out how the NTAS process and DHS 
CTAB supported addressing the heightened terrorism threat during the time period 
immediately following the 2011 Osama bin Laden raid: 
While DHS did not issue an NTAS alert based on the threat of reprisal 
attacks or information obtained at Bin Laden's hideout, the CTAB met 
daily for the first week, sometimes multiple times per day. In each 
meeting, the CTAB considered whether any of the new threat information, 
when weighed against current preventative measures, met the threshold of 
being “imminent and actionable” to warrant the issuance of an NTAS 
alert. While none did, I&A worked closely with the FBI and our partners 
throughout the intelligence community to disseminate information as 
appropriate to the local law enforcement community and the private 
sector. Additionally, TSA engaged in extensive outreach efforts with 
airports, airlines, and freight carriers, and implemented a series of new 
security measures in the weeks following while CBP identified additional 
targeting measures to disrupt potential retaliatory attacks.106 
This testimony represents the current strategic CT decision-making process, now known 
as the NTAS process. The NTAS process facilitates the timing and sequencing of DHS 
CT Coordinator and DHS CTAB strategic decision making and coordination activities, 
which enable tactical level success during periods heightened threat. The NTAS process 
outlined in this testimony remains the common practice in addressing terrorism threats 
and incidents since April 2011. 
104 “If intelligence is to be successful in preventing major surprise attacks, it must provide specific, 
tactical-level warning, and policymakers must be receptive to that warning.” Dahl, Intelligence and 
Surprise Attack, 176. 
105 According to Dahl, “Policymakers…typically say they want strategic intelligence; but…they are 
actually less likely to respond to long-range, broad assessments than to specific tactical-level warnings.” 
Ibid. 
106 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Ten Years after 9/11. 
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What is also important to note is Mr. Beers’ comment concerning how NTAS 
assisted in navigating the decision maker’s dilemma when considering the issuance of a 
terrorism warning. The CTAB considered its options and opted to utilize other methods. 
This option effectively facilitated CT efforts, while adequately balancing the need for 
OPSEC and in avoiding unnecessarily raising the public level of concern from a non-
specific terrorism threat. The CT Coordinator/CTAB provided strategic management of 
the NTAS process throughout this threat period. This clearly avoided “doing the 
terrorist’s job for them,” as McDermott and Zimbardo warned was a consequence of a 
mismanaged terrorism warning system.107 
In supporting the DHS CT Coordinator and the DHS CTAB, the NTAS process 
provides improvement in coordinating CT efforts. In communicating information with 
HSE partners regarding terrorism incidents and corresponding CT activities through JIBs, 
etc., the NTAS process also addresses the need for any alert or other warning it generates 
to provide timely detailed information. The NTAS positions DHS for continued 
improvement in the areas former DHS Secretary Napolitano declared: 
We also continue to expand our risk-based, intelligence-driven security 
efforts. By sharing and leveraging information, we can make informed 
decisions about how to best mitigate risk, and the more we know, the 
better we become at providing security that is seamless and efficient.108 
This statement represents the vision of former DHS Secretary Napolitano regarding how 
the NTAS and its process fulfills its mandate: “As I said, this new National Terrorism 
Advisory System is built on the common-sense belief that we are all in this together, and 
that we all have a role to play.”109 
107 Bongar et al., eds, Psychology of Terrorism, 358. 
108 “Written Testimony of Department of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano for a Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary Hearing Titled ‘The Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,”’ 
April 25, 2012, Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/04/25/written-
testimony-department-homeland-security-secretary-janet-napolitano-senate      
109 Janet Napolitano, “State of America’s Homeland Security Address,” January 27, 2011, 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/01/27/state-americas-homeland-security-address  
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C. CASE STUDY: 2013 BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING 
The Boston Marathon bombing occurred on April 15, 2013. The attack included 
two IEDs devised from common household pressure cookers. Two suspects carried out 
these attacks, brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The two IEDs successfully 
detonated, killing three and wounding over 260 marathon attendees. After these attacks, 
the FBI led a multi-agency investigation, which identified the two suspects and 
culminated in the death of Tamerlan Tsarnaev and in the capture of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev 
on April 19. 
The Tsarnaev family history in the United States spans approximately 11 years. 
Over the course of 2002 and 2003, the Tsarnaev family moved from Dagestan to the 
United States after their father, Anzor Tsarnaev, applied for asylum. In 2006, Tamerlan 
was granted lawful permanent resident status. On September 11, 2012, Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev became a naturalized U.S. citizen. According to a Wall Street Journal article, 
“The Tsarnaev family struggled with money during their time in the United States. [The 
Tsarnaevs] reportedly separated, though both returned to Russia before the Boston 
Marathon bombing.”110 
Despite the family financial struggles, the Tsarnaev brothers completed high 
school in the United States, Tamerlan in 2006 and Dzhokhar in 2011. Both pursued 
college educations with mixed results. According to a 2014 U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security report, “[I]n the fall of 2006 
[Tamerlan] attended Bunker Hill Community College part-time. He left the school in 
2008.”111 Dzhokhar attended the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth; however, 
“His grades were poor, but by nearly all public accounts he was well-liked and social.”112 
At the time of the bombing Dzhokhar remained enrolled at this university. 
110 Alan Cullison, Paul Sonne and Jennifer Levitz, “Life in America Unraveled for Brothers,” Wall 
Street Journal (Online) April 20, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323809304578432501435232278 
111 Committee on Homeland Security, The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and Lessons 
from the Marathon Bombings (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 10. 
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/documents/Boston-Bombings-Report-
Findings.pdf 
112 Ibid., 10. 
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Although the Tsarnaev brothers’ individual paths to radicalization appear 
different, the length of time for their radicalization is similar to the “Christmas Day 
bomber,” Abdulmutallab’s radicalization experience. The Tsarnaevs’ radicalization 
potentially occurred over the course of prior years, with their preparation timeline for the 
attack beginning a few months before April 15, 2013. According to the 2014 
congressional report, “The Tsarnaev family is ethnic Chechen.”113 This fact suggests a 
clear source of empathy for the brothers regarding the Chechen separatist movements 
against Russia raging in the North Caucasus region over the past two decades: 
It has not been determined whether the Boston Marathon bombing…is tied 
directly to the…ongoing terrorist activity in Dagestan, Chechnya, and 
across the North Caucasus. However, it is reasonable to assume that 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev was at least inspired by their activity and ideology, 
and driven to take part in the vision of global jihad which they share with 
al Qaeda.114 
Tamerlan’s radicalization experience appears to have started during his time in 
the United States, but it accelerated and calcified during a trip to the North Caucasus 
region in 2012. Upon returning to the United States, Tamerlan viewed and posted radical 
jihadi YouTube videos, “indicating some degree of radicalization had taken place while 
he was in Russia.”115 Additionally, Russian media reports a relationship with a 
radicalized Canadian citizen William Plotnikov: “Russian authorities were alerted to 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev after finding evidence of ‘frequent contacts’ between the two on 
William Plotnikov’s computer.”116 Plotnikov “converted to Islam 2009 and left Canada 
to join rebels in Dagestan.”117 However, “Plotnikov died during a shootout with Russian 
security services on July 14, 2012,” which is roughly when Tamerlan was in the 
113 Ibid., 9. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., 15. 
116 Fatima Tlisova, “Russians Closely Monitored Boston Bombing Suspect,” Voice of America, May 
7, 2013, accessed July 14, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/content/tsarnaev-dagestan-
bombing/1656176.html  
117 Stewart Bell, “The Canadian Who Converted to Jihad: Boxer Turned Militant Killed in Dagestan,” 
National Post, August 20, 2012, accessed July 14, 2014, 
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/08/20/dagestan/  
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Caucasus.118 The implications of this relationship are that Tamerlan was seeking or 
potentially had a relationship with radicalized groups in the North Caucasus. Regardless 
the nature of the direct relationship with Islamist radicals in the North Caucasus, 
Tamerlan’s behavior clearly demonstrates a consistent identification with the radical 
Islamist perspective and a disturbing evolution into a radical Islamist. 
Dzhokhar’s radicalization appears more vicarious, occurring through his “close 
relationship with his older brother” Tamerlan.119 This timing allowed Tamerlan to act as 
a mentor for Dzhokhar’s transformation. Psychologist Clark McCauley described the 
relationship: “His brother [Dzhokhar] admired him [Tamerlan], following him around the 
gym like a puppy.”120 When the Tsarnaev parents left the United States, leaving 
Dzhokhar alone and without a support network, “[i]t was Jahar’s [Dzhokhar’s] love and 
respect for his radicalized brother that gave him new direction after he lost everyday 
connections with high school friends and most of his family.”121 Dzhokhar grew more 
isolated as his broader social network degraded, and he drew closer to his brother. 
According to McCauley, “Jahar had lost connection with all of his family except 
Tamerlan.”122 In addition, McCauley expresses Dzhokhar’s radicalization in this way, 
“mechanisms of radicalization [were] at work…escalating [Dzhokhar’s] commitment to 
his brother’s bombing project.”123 
McCauley’s theory on Dzhokhar’s radicalization is further supported with 
accounts during the period of time when the two brothers were isolated building the 
bombs “in the third-floor Cambridge apartment that authorities say served as the unlikely 
epicenter of the Boston Marathon bombing plot.”124 Their downstairs Cambridge 
118 Ibid. 
119 Committee on Homeland Security, The Road to Boston, 10. 
120 Clark McCauley, “Radicalization of Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev,” Psychology Today [blog], 
April 19, 2013, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/friction/201304/radicalization-tamerlan-and-
dzhokhar-tsarnaev  
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Mark Morales, “Inside Devils’ Den Half-Eaten Meal on Table Sibs Lived Amid Squalor in 
Ramshackle Apt,” New York Daily News, April 21, 2013, sec. News. 
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apartment neighbor stated, “I lived right underneath them, and they were making bombs. 
It’s scary.”125 This period of time also reflects the level of commitment the two brothers 
demonstrated in conducting these attacks. They traveled to attain materials: “At 
Seabrook, NH… [Tamerlan] Tsarnaev paid $199.99 in cash for each of two…mortar kits 
that come with a tube and 24 shells.”126 The brothers painstakingly accumulated the 
materials and fabricated the bombs; they “emptied hundreds of packages of fireworks to 
create fuel for the bombs…. [T]he fuses were fashioned from Christmas lights and the 
improvised remote-control detonators were built from model car parts.”127 
It appears that whereas Tamerlan actively pursued radicalization, Dzhokhar 
radicalized more passively through the conditioning effects of his exclusive attachment to 
Tamerlan. Although the individual pathways varied, Fathali M. Moghaddam explains the 
Tsarnaev brothers’ shared radicalization: “[T]errorism is explained by perceptions of 
deprivations, by feelings of being treated unfairly, by a subjective sense of injustice, 
rather than by objective conditions, including poverty and low education.”128 This 
explanation is consistent with the paradoxical circumstances of the Tsarnaev 
radicalizations. Despite the fact that both enjoyed the opportunities afforded them from 
their living in the United States, through their radicalization they came to identify more 
with their Chechen roots. This radicalization resulted in their pursuit of terrorism in 
support of the Chechen societal frustration against their perceived enemy embodied in the 
adopted society they grew up in. As the brothers reached the conclusion of their journey 
to radicalization, they arrived as fully functioning terrorists. It is certainly demonstrated 
in Dzhokhar’s scrawled message on the inside of the boat in which he was captured: 
125 Ibid. 
126 Phil Mattingly, Roxana Tiron, and Margaret Talev, “Officials Study Brothers’ Islam Ties; Pair 
Allegedly behind Boston Marathon Attack were Said to be Drawn to Radical Islam on Internet,” 
Charleston Daily Mail (West Virginia), April 25, 2013, sec. News. 
127 Richard A. Serrano, “Boston Attackers May Have Had Help, U.S. Says,” Los Angeles Times, May 
22, 2014, sec. LATextra, Part AA, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-boston-bombing-20140522-
story.html 
128 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 46. 
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“[T]he U.S. government is killing our innocent civilians…. I can’t stand to see such evil 
go unpunished…. We Muslims are one body, you hurt one, you hurt us all.”129 
In late April 2013, the United States IC Inspectors’ General Forum directed an 
assessment related to the Boston Marathon bombing. This assessment evaluated three 
aspects of USG actions: 
• The extent of the information available to the U.S. government concerning 
the relevant individuals and events preceding the Boston Marathon 
bombings. 
• Whether the sharing of this information was complete, accurate, and in 
compliance with U.S. counterterrorism and information sharing, policies, 
regulations, and U.S. laws. 
• Whether there are weaknesses in protocols and procedures that impact the 
ability to detect potential threats to national security.130 
The Inspectors General (OIGs) for the Intelligence Community, the DOJ, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the DHS conducted this assessment and published 
it in April 2014 titled Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior 
to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings.131 This report targets tactical level 
actions taken by individuals in an effort to understand gaps in procedures, which may 
have led to the bombing on April 15, 2013. By identifying these gaps and recommending 
solutions, this assessment will assist in preventing future attacks. 
Firstly, the Inspectors General (IGs) assessment concludes that in the broader 
efforts of the USG, which may have been able to mitigate the Boston Marathon bombing 
occurred appropriately, “In light of our findings and conclusions…the participating OIGs 
found no basis to make broad recommendations for changes in information handling or 
sharing.”132 Secondarily, the assessment concludes that gaps in tactical level procedures 
and policies created an environment in which individual USG personnel decisions and 
129 McCauley, “‘Friction’ Mechanisms at Work: More about Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.” 
130 Inspectors General for the Intelligence Community, the Department of Justice, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, Unclassified Summary of Information 
Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings (Washington, DC: 
Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, 2014), 3.  
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., 25. 
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actions did not adequately prevent or otherwise mitigate this travel opportunity, “We 
nonetheless identified some areas in which existing policies or practices could be 
clarified or improved.”133 It is hard to quantify the degree to which Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s 
travel to the North Caucasus contributed to the radicalization of Tamerlan and Dzhokhar 
and led to their attack upon the Boston Marathon. However, the missed opportunities to 
identify this travel and understand what the pattern of behavior may have indicated 
created a lost opportunity to potentially prevent this attack. 
A 2014 DHS lessons learned report, Boston One Year Later: DHS’s Lessons 
Learned, regarding the Boston Marathon bombing notes the CTAB as point of 
coordination and synchronization as the department supported the incident. DHS notes 
the CTAB role in strategically integrating communications into the overall DHS and 
USG efforts, as it provided a senior decision making forum.134 Citing this 2014 report, 
Mike Levine of ABC News highlights many of the coordinated DHS actions for Boston: 
The DHS established ‘an extended perimeter to intercept potential 
suspects and interview witnesses,’ CBP helped deploy air assets and other 
forms of transportation support over the area, DHS provided briefings to 
State and local law enforcement and homeland security officials, critical 
infrastructure owners and operators, and faith-based organizations, ‘TSA 
heightened security throughout the Northeast region airports with 
increased explosive trace detection, canine deployment, gate checks and 
behavior detection activities,’ the Coast Guard ‘immediately raised and 
coordinated its on-water security presence with increased patrols 24/7 in 
the inner harbor and along ferry routes,’ and the Secret Service ‘utilized its 
New England Electronic Crimes Task Force to collect and review business 
surveillance videos in proximity to the bombing site for evidence related 
to investigation.’135 
During this incident the NTAS and its process was supported CT decision 
making, coordination, and communication through the DHS CT Coordinator and the 
CTAB. This NTAS support is demonstrated in the activities above specific to the Boston 
incident. It is also evidenced in the previously cited congressional testimony from the 
133 Ibid.  
134 Department of Homeland Security, Boston One Year Later: DHS’s Lessons Learned (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 9. 
135 Levine and Ferran, “Boston One Year Later: DHS’s Lessons Learned.” 
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former DHS CT Coordinator regarding the common practice the NTAS process provides 
during incidents. 
The actions of state and local officials in the Boston Metro area present solid 
evidence regarding how targeted communications, similar to that embodied in NTAS, are 
effective. State and local officials used the same approach as NTAS, which is to provide 
detailed and timely information to the citizenry in order to elicit their assistance in the 
situation through press conferences and other public statements. An example of how the 
NTAS process supported the incident is the use of other methods of communication, such 
as a JIB as well as various press statements and press conferences from various officials 
involved in handling the incident. The following prepared statement describes this 
support: 
NTAS was designed to provide information to the public and stakeholders 
in a timely manner when there is a specific and credible terrorist threat. A 
public alert is only one part of that system, which also includes the 
distribution of information to state, local and federal officials, as well as 
pertinent stakeholders. Following the Boston Bombing, out of an 
abundance of caution, DHS remained at a heightened state of vigilance, 
but the specific facts did not warrant the issuance of a public NTAS alert. 
Still, significant outreach occurred including several intelligence bulletins, 
multiple briefings not only with state, local and federal officials but also 
with private sector stakeholders and faith-based groups, and with the 
public through a variety of public statements. In this instance, state and 
local entities in the affected area had already issued public alerts and there 
was widespread coverage of this FBI led investigation.136 
The Tsarnaevs’ successfully conducted an act of terrorism; their murderous act 
left three people dead and 260 injured. Mistakes were made within the HSE that 
potentially enhanced the likelihood of success for this attack. However, despite the initial 
success the Tsarnaevs’ enjoyed, they were neutralized in relatively quick order, within 
the span of four days. This is in no small part a result of a well-coordinated investigation 
and the activities of the HSE partners supporting that investigation, such as the NTAS 
process and the CTAB. 
136 Department of Homeland Security, Prepared Statement Regarding NTAS during Boston Marathon 
Bombing (Washington, DC: Office of Public Affairs, 2013). 
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D. CASE STUDY ASSESSMENT 
1. Standard Panel of Questions Examination 
Table 2 reflects the outcome of examining NTAS with the standard panel of 
questions. The NTAS successes are apparent and scored well in response to the 
questions. What follows is a summary supporting the answers reflected in the panel of 
questions. 
Table 2.   NTAS Assessment Panel Responses  
NTAS Assessment Panel Answer Explanation 
Management of system 
established? Yes 
DHS established management through 
designating the CT Coordinator and chartering 
the CTAB. 
Was management of system 
sustained, durable, and 
effective? 
Yes 
Noted in testimony and lessons learned 
reporting, the CTAB functioned well. 
Was there a defined decision 
making process utilized to 
reach a decision? 
Yes 
As directed in PPD-7, the NTAS provided this 
process. 
Was the decision making 
process sufficiently effective? Yes 
NTAS proved effective decision advantage, 
supporting strategic CT coordination, 
communication and decision making. 
Was the decision making 
process sustainable in 
providing a repeatable and 
consistent method of reaching 
a decision? 
Yes 
In two noted terrorism situations, NTAS 
provided repeatable and consistent decision 
support. 
Was the decision making 
process timely in supporting 
the situation? Yes 
NTAS met its 24 hour a day and seven day a 
week mission support requirement. Noted in the 
Boston incident, NTAS was immediately 
executed within minutes of the explosions. 
Was the decision making 
process sufficiently adaptable 
to provide effective decision 
support for situations 




NTAS adapted to the fluid Boston Marathon 
bombing tempo. 
Was there a decision making 
body designated to make this 
decision? 
Yes 
The CTAB is the chartered decision making 
body. 
Was it necessary for a 
designated decision making 
body to exist? 
Yes 
As proved in the failures of HSAS, a designated 
decision making body is needed. 
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NTAS Assessment Panel Answer Explanation 
Was there a defined convening 
process for gathering the 
decision makers together? 
Yes 
The NTAS process provides this convening 
process. 
Was this convening process 
timely and sustainable when 
the situation required multiple 
decisions over the course of 
extended periods? 
Yes 
The NTAS process supported multiple CTAB 
meetings and other operation tempo 
requirements throughout the four day period. 
Based upon the outcome of the 
original decision, was the 
decision making process 
sufficient in supplying 
decision advantage to 
subsequent decision makers 
dealing with the situation? 
Yes 
As noted in testimony and lesson learned 
reports, the strategic coordination and decisions 
positively supported downstream decisions and 
actions dealing with the situation. 
Was this system the only or 
principal decision support 
pathway through which the 
decision reached decision 
makers? 
Yes 
The NTAS process provided the principal 
pathway. 
Did the system support 
original and secondary 
decision makers? Yes 
As noted in testimony and lessons learned 
reports, information and guidance derived from 
the NTAS process supported both groups of 
decision makers. 
Did the system support 
coordination of efforts dealing 
with the situation? 
Yes 
As noted in testimony and lessons learned 
reports, NTAS provide support to strategic CT 
coordination throughout the incident. 
If supporting coordination of 
efforts, did the system work 
effectively? 
Yes 
NTAS effectively supported the successful 
neutralization of the terrorist threat presented 
from the Tsarnaev brothers. 
Was there a designated 
communication method for the 
dissemination of the decision? Yes 
Although an alert was not generated from the 
NTAS Process, JIBs, press statements and other 
direct forms of communication were utilized as 
part of the flexible NTAS process. 
Was the decision 
communicated effectively? Yes 
NTAS facilitated effective communication from 
the first few minutes until the concluding 
moments of the incident. 
 
NTAS enjoyed the advantage of a dedicated CT decision-making body in the 
DHS CTAB. Just as it did during the time following the Osama Bin Laden raid, the 
NTAS process provided decision advantage to DHS and other members of the HSE. 
During that four-day period in April 2013, officials followed the same NTAS process in 
support of the same tempo the former DHS CT Coordinator Rand Beers articulated in 
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congressional testimony regarding the threat period after the Osama Bin Laden raid.137 In 
fulfillment of its chartered CT coordination mission, the DHS CTAB convened 
repeatedly and strategically guided the overall effort for the department. The DHS 
CTAB, supported through the NTAS process, ensured decision makers at every level of 
the HSE received the information needed to make decisions and take appropriate actions. 
Through ensuring information and intelligence was shared appropriately, as pointed out 
in the OIG report and in Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Jensen congressional 
testimony: 
The attack in Boston on April 15, 2013 fully engaged the communications 
processes and capabilities DHS has put in place over the past ten years. 
Within minutes of notification of the attack the [DHS] Office of Public 
Affairs began mobilizing its resources and our Federal incident 
communications process. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston, FBI 
Boston Field Office, Massachusetts State Police, Boston Police 
Department, and the Suffolk County Sherriff’s Office served as the lead 
on-scene communicators and participated in NICCL calls [National 
Incident Communications Coordination Line]. These calls, which included 
the Federal interagency, provided participants with a coordinated 
communications path in the immediate aftermath of the attack.138 
The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) activities Mr. Jensen mentions provides one example 
of the strategically coordinated activities. This example is part of the numerous CT 
activities the NTAS process leverages in support of the DHS CTAB and other members 
of the HSE. 
In addition to the previously cited DHS actions for the bombing, the DHS report, 
Boston One Year Later, further reflects other DHS CTAB coordinated and NTAS process 
supported activities: 
[DHS] OPS [Office of Operations Coordination and Planning] and I&A 
[Intelligence and Analysis], together with other DHS components, 
immediately began working on what was known in order to keep DHS 
officials, stakeholders, law enforcement, and the wider public informed. 
137 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Ten Years after 9/11. 
138 Why Can’t DHS (Homeland Security Department) Better Communicate with the American 
People?: Before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Management Efficiency, 113th Cong., 8 (2013) (statement of Mr. Robert Jensen, Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 
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The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) began immediate 
notification and communications support…the DHS Crisis Action Team 
initiated National Level Reporting…displayed and shared on the DHS 
Common Operating Picture. The NOC facilitated communication requests 
between the Boston Mayor’s Office and several DHS components…and 
leveraged its close working relationship with the Boston Police 
Department. I&A activated the Intelligence Crisis Action Team (ICAT) to 
analyze and confirm information regarding the incident. Later, the ICAT 
expanded to a DHS Threat Task Force to include representatives from 
CBP, FEMA, ICE, NPPD, OPS, TSA, USCG, USCIS and 
USSS…assuming other law enforcement and Intelligence Community 
support responsibilities. The Task Force published a twice-daily common 
intelligence picture of vetted all-source reporting and actions for internal 
dissemination within DHS and to inform external engagements. I&A and 
FBI published three unclassified Joint Intelligence Bulletins for use by law 
enforcement, covering confirmed aspects of the investigation, including 
details about the explosive devices and protective measures for use by law 
enforcement.139 
An NTAS generated alert was not issued. However, it is clear that information and 
intelligence was effectively shared in other methods or pathways. Therefore, effective 
warning and decision advantage was facilitated through the NTAS process and the DHS 
CTAB. 
2. Theory of Preventive Action 
In the case of the Boston Marathon bombing, the Tsarnaev brothers were able to 
achieve surprise and successfully conduct their attack. As noted earlier, the paradox of 
strategic warning proves instructive to understanding what enhanced the likelihood of the 
Tsarnaevs’ enjoying the element of surprise for their attack. This case study noted there 
was sufficient information available to potentially identify a developing threat and 
provide specific warning to receptive decision-makers; thereby, potentially mitigating 
this attack. According to the theory of preventive action, this equates to a failure of 
effective warning for officials in order to take necessary measures to prevent the attack.  
As the OIG report and congressional lessons learned report for this incident 
reflect, the Tsarnaevs’ radicalization combined with Tamerlan’s travel and the two 
139 Department of Homeland Security, Boston One Year Later: DHS’s Lessons Learned, 8. 
 58 
                                                 
brothers’ other activities, presented an opportunity for warning and potentially for 
receptive decision makers to take steps in mitigating this threat. Unfortunately, this did 
not happen, and the Tsarnaevs’ were able to successfully conduct a surprise attack on the 
marathon. However, after the initial attack, the case study demonstrates that officials 
were able to successfully capture or kill the Tsarnaev brothers. The preventive action 
theory provides a favorable assessment for the level of warning provided to the decision-
making officials guiding the handling of the situation as well as their level of 
receptiveness to act on the warning information provided. This level of warning and 
decision advantage enabled the successful neutralization of the persistent threat posed 
from the Tsarnaev brothers. 
3. The RPV Framework 
The RPV framework states, “Organizations create value as employees transform 
inputs of resources—people, equipment, technology, product designs, brands, 
information, energy, and cash—into products and services of greater worth.”140 In 
keeping with the tenets of the RPV framework, the CTAB and the NTAS process assisted 
DHS and other HSE members with “The patterns of interaction, coordination, 
communication, and decision-making” sufficient to address the persistent threat.141 
Therefore, the RPV framework reveals the success of the NTAS process in addressing the 
continued threat from the Tsarnaev brothers in the aftermath of the initial bombing attack 
at the Boston Marathon. NTAS succeeded through supporting strategic level coordination 
of the very diverse independent actions members of the HSE conducted in dealing with 
the fluid challenges the Boston Marathon bombing situation presented. The NTAS 
process provided a sustainable and repeatable methodology for CT decision making, 
coordination, and communication, vis-à-vis improved decision advantage. 
140 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 187. 
141 Ibid. 
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E. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
In this case study, NTAS demonstrated its agility and its sustainability throughout 
the four-day situation. The NTAS process supported CT coordination in a sustainable and 
repeatable manner consistent with the manner in which the former DHS CT Coordinator 
outlined regarding previous incidents. Although an NTAS generated alert was not issued, 
other forms of communication, such as JIBs and press statements, were produced and 
utilized effectively in support of CT efforts. This sustained responsiveness is critically 
important in light of the consequences avoided through the timely neutralization of the 
Tsarnaev brothers. Consequences, as Dzhokhar Tsarnaev related “…to investigators 
during questioning that he and his brother at one point intended to drive to New York 
City and detonate their explosives in Times Square.”142 If the Tsarnaev brothers managed 
to change the conditions of the situation, NTAS provided the necessary flexibility to 
support the broadened scope of CT coordination amongst the members of the HSE. 
NTAS also was positioned to supply effective warning to a much broader community 
through an alert generated from NTAS.  
Support for the Boston Marathon bombing incident demonstrates NTAS fulfills 
its PPD-7 mission by providing: 
A system the American public can have confidence in; Advisories that 
contain clear and concise language, readily understandable by the 
American public; Advisories that contain as detailed information as 
possible, without jeopardizing sources, collection methods, or an active 
disruption effort or investigation; Advisories that identify protective 
measures, where appropriate, that are tailored to specific sectors across the 
country, to including components of the Federal Government; State, local, 
and tribal government entities; critical infrastructure entities; and selected 
private sector partners; Advisories that have a set duration, where the 
information is regularly re-evaluated; and A system that is consistent and 
agile, where the advisories are capable of being raised or lowered quickly 
and efficiently.143 
142 Jerry Markon, Sari Horwitz and Peter Finn, “Authorities: Tsarnaev Brothers Planned Attack on 
New York’s Times Square,” The Washington Post April 26, 2013. 
143 Executive Office of the President, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-7. 
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NTAS is a consistent and agile system as it supplies a durable and flexible methodology 
in accomplishing its mission. For these reasons, NTAS is an effective terrorism warning 
system capable of providing sufficient warnings. It also provides decision advantage to 
decision makers at every level of the HSE and the American public. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
This research topic required a qualitative approach in answering the research 
questions. Case studies for the two U.S. terrorism warning systems support the standard 
comparative analysis method. The assessment framework for this method relied upon a 
standardized panel of questions and two additional theories (RPV framework and theory 
of preventative action). The RPV framework assessed the process or functional aspects of 
each warning system. The theory of preventive action supported assessment of the 
decision advantage provided from the systems. 
Two major themes spring from this body of research in response to the primary 
and secondary research questions: functional effectiveness and decision advantage. The 
first theme relates to the functional effectiveness of a terrorism warning system. 
Terrorism warning systems address a complex problem set due to the adaptability of the 
deliberate human threat these systems face. These systems provide warnings for internal 
(organizational or for official decision-makers) and external (other partner organizations 
or the public) categories of constituents. They must support resolution of the decision 
maker’s dilemma, balancing between the need to warn people in danger from terrorism 
with the need to maintain OPSEC for CT efforts mitigating that danger. A system is 
effective if it capably fulfills these two thematic functions related to providing warning 
and decision advantage. 
The functional effectiveness theme directly correlates to the second theme evident 
in this research. The second theme, decision advantage, embodies the level of trust or 
confidence the system sustains from the organizations and people it serves. This 
confidence factor demonstrates the belief level attributed to the system, which translates 
into the level of responsiveness or willingness to take action the system generates with its 
warnings or decision advantage efforts. 
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A. FUNCTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
Table 3 presents the combined assessment results for both HSAS and NTAS. 
Reflected in the Christmas Day bombing case study and the numerous reports and studies 
cited thus far, HSAS did not maintain or function with any tenet of an effective terrorism 
warning system. It did not provide timely detailed threat information, nor did it provide 
clear and understandable protective actions. Furthermore, it failed to provide a clear 
duration of a period of threat. Additionally, it was not consistent in changing the color-
code levels. Finally, it also failed to provide decision advantage. The results, reflected in 
Table 3, further demonstrate the HSAS failures in maintaining a methodology to warn 
and provide decision advantage. In reports, surveys and testimony concerning HSAS, it is 
clear that HSAS created more confusion amongst decision makers than it provided 
decision advantage. After over six years of using HSAS, these combined factors of 
systemic ineffectiveness resulted in a widespread loss of confidence in the system. This 
ineffectiveness resulted in the continued marginalization of HSAS as a terrorism warning 
system. HSAS was so ineffective that it was not central in addressing a clear incident of 
terrorism in December 2009. 
Table 3.   NTAS/HSAS Comparison System Characteristics Matrix  
System Characteristic HSAS NTAS Comparative Evaluation 
Management of system 
established? No Yes 
HSAS had no formal management system. 
NTAS had established management through 
designating the CT Coordinator and 
chartering the CTAB. 
Was management of system 
sustained, durable, and 
effective? 
No Yes 
Not applicable for HSAS. Noted in 
testimony and lessons learned reporting, the 
CTAB functioned well for NTAS. 
Was there a defined 
decision making process 
utilized to reach a decision? 
No Yes 
HSAS had no defined decision making 
process was utilized. As directed in PPD-7, 
the NTAS provided this process. 
Was the decision making 
process sufficiently 
effective? No Yes 
Several cited reports, testimony and 
assessments provide evidence that HSAS 
supported decision making was ineffective. 
NTAS proved effective decision advantage, 
supporting strategic CT coordination, 
communication and decision making. 
Was the decision making 
process sustainable in No Yes 
Not applicable for HSAS. In two noted 
terrorism situations, NTAS provided 
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System Characteristic HSAS NTAS Comparative Evaluation 
providing a repeatable and 
consistent method of 
reaching a decision? 
repeatable and consistent decision support. 
Was the decision making 
process timely in supporting 
the situation? No Yes 
Not applicable for HSAS. NTAS met its 24 
hour a day and seven day a week mission 
support requirement. Noted in the Boston 
incident, NTAS was immediately executed 
within minutes of the explosions. 
Was the decision making 
process sufficiently 
adaptable to provide 
effective decision support 
for situations anticipated 
and unanticipated and/or 
deliberate/non-deliberate? 
No Yes 
Not applicable for HSAS. NTAS adapted to 
the fluid Boston Marathon bombing tempo. 
Was there a decision 
making body designated to 
make this decision? No Yes 
Presidential Directives named cabinet level 
officials responsible for collaborating on 
these decisions. However, no formal decision 
making body was chartered for HSAS. For 
NTAS the CTAB is the chartered decision 
making body. 
Was it necessary for a 
designated decision-making 
body to exist? Yes Yes 
This presented a major gap in HSAS. As 
proved in the failures of HSAS, a designated 
decision making body is needed. The 
successful application of a designated body 
in support of NTAS provides evidence of 
how detrimental this gap was for HSAS. 
Was there a defined 
convening process for 
gathering the decision 
makers together? No Yes 
Several cited reports and assessments note 
the lack of defined process for HSAS. The 
NTAS Process provides this convening 
process, in accordance with written NTAS 
Concept of Operations and standard 
operating procedures. 
Was this convening process 
timely and sustainable when 
the situation required 
multiple decisions over the 
course of extended periods? No Yes 
Several cited reports, testimony and 
assessments provide a cumulative picture of 
the lack of sustainability and timeliness in 
HSAS supported decision making. The 
NTAS Process supported multiple CTAB 
meetings and other operation tempo 
requirements throughout the four day Boston 
Marathon bombing incident. 
Based upon the outcome of 
the original decision, was 
the decision making process 
sufficient in supplying 
decision advantage to 
subsequent decision makers 
dealing with the situation? 
No Yes 
Cited reports, testimony and assessments 
note that the HSE at large was often 
confused by HSAS decisions. This created 
cascading failures in decision making at 
every level of the HSE. As noted in 
testimony and lesson learned reports, the 
strategic coordination and decisions from 
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System Characteristic HSAS NTAS Comparative Evaluation 
NTAS positively supported downstream 
decisions and actions dealing with the 
situation. 
Was this system the only or 
principal decision support 
pathway through which the 
decision reached decision 
makers? 
No Yes 
HSAS was not the only or even principle 
system toward the end of its service life. The 
NTAS Process provided the principal 
pathway. 
Did the system support 
original and secondary 
decision makers? No Yes 
As noted in testimony and lessons learned 
reports, HSAS ineffectively provided 
decision support. However, information and 
guidance derived from the NTAS Process 
supported both groups of decision makers. 
Did the system support 
coordination of efforts 
dealing with the situation? No Yes 
As noted in testimony and lessons learned 
reports, HSAS did not effectively support 
strategic CT coordination throughout the 
incident; whereas, NTAS effectively 
performed this role. 
If supporting coordination 
of efforts, did the system 
work effectively? 
No Yes 
NTAS effectively supported the successful 
neutralization of the terrorist threat presented 
from the Tsarnaev brothers. 
Was there a designated 
communication method for 
the dissemination of the 
decision? Yes Yes 
HSAS color coded alert levels represented 
the principle communication method. 
Although an alert was not generated from the 
NTAS process, JIBs, press statements and 
other direct forms of communication were 
utilized as part of the flexible NTAS process 
for the Boston Marathon bombing.  
Was the decision 
communicated effectively? 
Yes Yes 
HSAS color coded alerts minimally 
communicated threat level changes. 
However, as noted in reports and testimony, 
these color code changes were neither well 
detailed nor contained enough specificity for 
decision makers to effectively utilize. NTAS 
facilitated effective communication from the 
first few minutes until the concluding 
moments of the incident. 
 
On the other hand, NTAS continues to function in keeping with the tenets of an 
effective terrorism warning system, which are listed above as HSAS points of failure. 
These tenets are demonstrated in the Boston Marathon bombing case study. The NTAS 
supported effective warning through the provision of communication tools, such as JIBs, 
etc. In support of the ongoing investigation, it provided decision advantage to the CTAB 
and other senior leaders throughout the four day incident. It was also positioned to 
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provide broader support to the larger HSE community and the public, if the Tsarnaev 
brothers managed to escape authorities and put other areas under threat.144 Since its 
inception in 2011, the system continues to provide a durable and sustainable process 
critical for success as a terrorism warning system. As shown in Table 3, when assessed 
with the standard panel of questions the NTAS results reflect this reality. It is also 
demonstrated in the comments provided from Mr. Beers concerning the 2011 Osama Bin 
Laden raid.145 
1. The RPV Framework 
Christensen’s RPV framework evaluates three factors indicating an organization, 
system, etc. is capable in accomplishing its goals. These factors are resources, processes 
and values. Resources “are usually things, or assets….,”146 and processes are “[t]he 
patterns of interaction, coordination, communication, and decision-making….”147 
Additionally, values are, “the criteria by which decisions about priorities are made.”148 
The RPV framework assesses the requirements of a job and then matches the job with an 
individual, process, etc. capable of accomplishing that job successfully. 
(1) HSAS 
The HSAS suffered from poorly defined process or methodology. The patterns of 
interaction, coordination, and decision making for HSAS were not repeatable or durable. 
The RPV framework states: “Organizations create value as employees transform inputs 
of resources—people, equipment, technology, product designs, brands, information, 
energy, and cash—into products and services of greater worth.”149 As reported to the 
U.S. Congress, HSAS did not establish this RPV success requirement. It did not have a 
defined methodology or even a designated group of decision makers, who were 
144 In the HSE, this is the collection of decision makers or groups from the individual citizen up to the 
most senior policy maker. 
145 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Ten Years after 9/11. 
146 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 186. 
147 Ibid., 187. 
148 Ibid., 188. 
149 Ibid., 187. 
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consistently involved in these decisions. This lack of methodology bespeaks a lack of a 
management capacity. This lack of a management capacity means that HSAS was 
dependent upon the individuals, who were coincidentally responsible for operating the 
system whenever it was needed. This fact is demonstrated throughout its performance 
history, and it is highlighted in the Christmas Day bombing case study by the fact that it 
served no central role for any party involved with the incident. 
The results of this type of approach are predictable. According to the RPV 
framework, an organization that relies solely on the competency of the individuals 
operating a system without the benefit of a defined process is doomed to fail. Christensen 
explains this maxim of the RPV framework in this way:  
Frequently, they [the organization] assume that if the people working on a 
project individually have the requisite capabilities to get the job done well, 
then the organization in which they work will also have the same 
capability to succeed. This often is not the case.150  
This lack of consistent process was identified in previous GAO reports as well as in the 
HSAC Task Force review of the system. 
Due to a lack of methodology, such as management, defined process, and 
organizational values, the HSAS relied too heavily on individual performances in order to 
accomplish the collective organizational mission of HSAS. The HSAS did not maintain a 
consistent repeatable methodology for warning (color code change) or in providing 
decision advantage (no designated decision-making body, etc.). This resulted in the 
outcome Christensen forecasts151 for any organization or system overly reliant on 
individual performance—repeated failure. 
However, HSAS did maintain a successful grant funding authorization capability. 
This capability provided jurisdictions, “funds for necessary operational overtime costs in 
response to an increase in threat level under the HSAS.”152 These jurisdictions applied 
150 Ibid., 185. 
151 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 185–208. 
152 Elizabeth M. Harmon, “Impact of National Terrorism Advisory System on Homeland Security 
Grant Programs,” Grants Program Directorate Information Bulletin no. 367 (Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2011).  
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for reimbursement authorization through the DHS FEMA Grants Program Directorate. 
Once approved, these jurisdictions could utilize currently available grant funds awarded 
to their State, locality, urban area or tribe in order to reimburse related overtime 
expenses. This funding authorization capability transitioned to NTAS when it replaced 
HSAS. 
(2) NTAS 
The NTAS and the CTAB successfully demonstrate this RPV hallmark of 
success. The NTAS and CTAB provide sufficient management, defined process and 
organizational values. Unlike HSAS, it is not overly reliant upon individual performance, 
because it provided internal controls through a chartered decision-making body as well as 
concept of operations and standard operating procedures documents. In keeping with the 
tenets of the RPV framework, the CTAB and the NTAS process empowers DHS and 
other HSE members with “The patterns of interaction, coordination, communication, and 
decision-making…” sufficient to address the persistent threat.153  
The NTAS is positioned for success because it improves the level of CT focus for 
the organizations and decision makers it serves. This focus derives from a well-defined 
process and effective management by the DHS CT Coordinator and the CTAB. 
Christensen articulates this critical success of NTAS where HSAS failed: “This is why 
focused organizations perform so much better than unfocused ones: their processes and 
values are match carefully with the set of tasks that need to be done.”154 Therefore, the 
RPV framework reveals the success of the NTAS process in addressing the continued 
threat from the Tsarnaev brothers in the aftermath of the initial bombing attack at the 
Boston Marathon. NTAS succeeded in focusing DHS and its decision makers throughout 
the incident. It accomplished this through supporting strategic level coordination of the 
diverse independent actions members of the HSE conducted in dealing with the fluid 
challenges the Boston Marathon bombing situation. This improved CT focus is a direct 
result of the NTAS because it provides a sustainable and repeatable methodology for CT 
153 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 187. 
154 Ibid., 197, 286. 
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decision making, coordination, and communication, vis-à-vis improved decision 
advantage. 
2. Trust and Confidence Level 
As experts argue, engendering and sustaining trust and confidence is a terrorism 
warning system’s central task. It is critical that a terrorism warning system enjoy the trust 
and confidence of the organizations and people it serves. These constituents fit into two 
categories: internal and external. The internal category consists of the officials and 
organizations performing CT efforts to counter the threat of terrorism. The external 
category consists of those who are in danger and benefit from the advisories of the 
terrorism warning system. 
HSAS suffered a downward trajectory of trust and confidence clearly 
demonstrated in over six years of performance history and numerous reports and 
congressional testimony. Inconsistent methodology for its usage as a warning system and 
in how it provided little decision advantage resulted in this low trust and confidence level 
amongst both constituent categories. The Christmas Day bombing case study presented 
the low ebb on this downward trajectory for the system. By 2009, it was so marginalized 
from the decision-making process and in supporting CT efforts the system did not play 
any role in addressing this situation. Emblematic of this lack of trust and confidence, 
Secretary Napolitano requested the HSAC Task Force review the system, which 
ultimately resulted in its decommissioning and complete replacement in 2011. 
Despite the failure of HSAS as a terrorism warning system, it provided three 
useful services. First, it maintained a level of visibility concerning the threat of terrorism. 
It supplied a funding vehicle through which affected jurisdictions could receive 
reimbursement for operating costs. Secondly, it served as a source of lessons learned in 
developing its successor NTAS. HSAS did provide some decision advantage to the 
HSAC Task Force. As the task force analyzed the system and its performance, it 
represented the tenets of what a terrorism warning system should be in displaying all that 
it was not. 
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Unlike HSAS, the NTAS enjoys sufficient trust and confidence amongst the 
internal category of constituents. This conclusion is supported from the NTAS 
performance during the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing case study as well as from the 
collective weight of public statements and testimony about the system’s performance at 
other times. 
The NTAS maintains sufficient trust and confidence amongst the internal 
category, but it is difficult to assess the level of trust and confidence among the external 
category. NTAS has never issued a public alert. Subsequently, these external constituents 
do not have any experience with the system and therefore sufficient familiarity with the 
system. This lack of experience creates a possible credibility gap due to a lack of 
understanding amongst members of the external category.  
Within this theme, a lack of understanding of the role of NTAS and its functions 
seems to emerge regarding the external category of constituents. Billy Hallowell’s 
comment reflects this: 
To date, though, no practical information has been disseminated through 
the NTAS system. If its creation was intended to alert the public about 
credible and important information regarding threats, then one must 
assume that there has either been no legitimate information about threats 
intercepted by the government since its official adoption in April 2011—
or that the system is simply not being used.155 
This lack of understanding potentially creates an undue focus upon the issuance of an 
alert and not on the real “heart” of the system, which is the coordination process used to 
make it work. This misplaced focus creates a misperception that the NTAS is not 
working, when in fact, it is working as intended. This potentially casts doubt about the 
system within external category of decision-makers. This doubt may cause a lack of 
sufficient responsiveness to any alert issued from the system to this category, such as a 
public NTAS alert. 
155 Billy Hallowell, “Looking for Gov’t-Issued Terror Alert? DHS Has Never Used its ‘Terrorism 




                                                 
3. Preventive Action Theory 
Dr. Erik Dahl’s theory of preventive action seeks to explain how to avoid surprise 
attacks from occurring. In his explanation of the theory’s application, Dr. Dahl states, “If 
intelligence is to be most useful in preventing major surprise attacks, it must provide 
specific, tactical-level warning, and policymakers must be receptive to that warning.”156 
Although a terrorism warning system is not strictly an intelligence mechanism, it is 
certainly a pathway through which decision makers receive intelligence and other types 
of inputs when making a CT decision regarding terrorism.  
Decision makers who employ the national terrorism warning systems, such as 
HSAS or NTAS, reside at the highest strategic level. Subsequently, these national level 
systems face a difficulty in achieving decision advantage for these decision-makers. Dr. 
Dahl states, “This is the paradox of strategic warning. Policymakers, especially at senior 
levels, typically say they want strategic intelligence; but…they are less likely to respond 
to long-range, broad assessments than they are to specific, tactical-level warnings.”157 
The difficulty is in sufficiently providing them the specific, tactical-level warning at this 
strategic level. Moreover, terrorism warning systems must provide warning in a manner 
that fosters sufficient decision makers’ trust and confidence to effectively employ the 
warning system. It is this level of decision makers’ trust and confidence that Dr. Dahl 
refers to as “receptivity.”158 Therefore, according to preventive action theory, if the 
system sufficiently provides warning and it sustains sufficient decision makers’ trust and 
confidence decision advantage is possible. When decision advantage is achieved for 
“receptive” decision makers, Dr. Dahl’s studies conclude this positive outcome, “when 
warning has been specific, and policymakers have been receptive, attacks have been 
successfully prevented.”159 
The RPV framework examined the warning aspect or functional effectiveness 
theme of this research for HSAS and NTAS. The preventive action theory examined the 
156 Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack, 176. 
157 Ibid., 177. 
158 Ibid., 175–184. 
159 Ibid., 176. 
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trust and confidence aspect of each system. This is important, because if a system 
engenders sufficient trust and confidence in decision makers, it is more likely to be 
successful in accomplishing its role in CT efforts.  
(1) HSAS 
An assessment of HSAS with the preventive action theory reveals the following 
critical shortcomings that generated a clear lack of trust and confidence in this system. 
HSAS lacked a defined and repeatable decision-making process. A consistently receptive 
decision-making body designed to function strictly in a CT capacity did not exist for 
HSAS. This combined lack of a consistent decision making process and designated CT 
decision-making body played a role in the mercurial results of the HSAS.  
Directed in HSPD-3 and HSPD-5, the decision makers consisted of a small group 
of the most senior policymakers in the USG, the President of the United States, the 
Attorney General, and the DHS Secretary. The level of HSAS usage over the course of its 
history from 2002–2011 demonstrates a clear fluctuation in decision makers’ receptivity 
and confidence in HSAS. From its inception in March 2002 until August 2006, 16 
changes to the color codes occurred. However, during the last year of the Bush 
administration no changes occurred. What is particularly telling is that after the 
presidential administration transition in 2008, HSAS remained inert until its replacement 
by NTAS in April 2011. This is despite at least two clear terrorist attacks occurring after 
transition, the 2009 Najibullah Zazi and Christmas Day bomber terrorist incidents. This 
demonstrates a clear degradation of decision makers’ confidence for HSAS. 
It also consistently failed to provide a reliable pathway for detailed and timely 
information in support of senior decision makers’ needs. Consequently, this lack of trust 
impaired decision making at all levels of the HSE; which in turn, sowed a great deal of 
confusion amongst the members for the HSE in coordinating, communicating, or 
executing appropriate countermeasures. This means HSAS never consistently provided 
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warning or successfully addressed the paradox of strategic warning.160 Consequently, 
HSAS did not consistently provide decision advantage to HSE decision makers. 
(2) NTAS 
In the case of the Boston Marathon bombing, the Tsarnaev brothers achieved 
surprise and successfully conducted their attack. Erik Dahl’s paradox of strategic warning 
proves instructive to understanding what enhanced the likelihood of the Tsarnaevs’ 
enjoying the element of surprise for their attack. This case study noted there was 
sufficient information available to potentially identify a developing threat and provide 
specific warning to receptive decision makers, thereby, potentially mitigating this attack. 
According to the theory of preventive action, this equates to a failure of effective warning 
for officials in order to take necessary measures to prevent the attack. The OIG report and 
congressional lessons learned report for this incident reflect, the Tsarnaevs’ radicalization 
combined with Tamerlan’s travel and the two brothers’ other suspicious activities, 
presented an opportunity for warning and potentially for receptive decision makers to 
take steps in mitigating this threat. Unfortunately, this did not happen, and the Tsarnaevs’ 
were able to successfully conduct a surprise attack on the marathon. 
There is a theoretical failure presented in the Boston Marathon bombing case 
study. DHS personnel from at least one component were directly involved in the run-up 
to the incident. It appears that some of this information did not flow up to decision 
makers. This indicates a potential NTAS process failure in providing pre-incident 
information. Moreover, this information could have resulted in sufficient decision 
advantage to take potentially mitigating actions. Since this conclusion is hypothetical in 
nature, it is difficult to ascertain with any certainty what this alternative outcome may 
have looked like. However, after the initial attack, the case study demonstrates that 
officials were able to successfully capture or kill the Tsarnaev brothers. Subsequently, the 
preventive action theory provides a favorable assessment for the level of warning NTAS 
provided to the decision-making officials guiding the handling of the situation as well as 
160 This paradox contributes to the likelihood terrorist attacks succeed, because decision makers lack 
the type of detailed timely information necessary to prevent a terrorist attack. 
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their level of receptiveness to act on the warning information provided. This enabled the 
successful neutralization of the persistent threat posed from the Tsarnaev brothers. 
B. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Thematically, these two systems addressed the same complex terrorism problem 
set. However, they did so in different manners. From a functional effectiveness 
perspective, HSAS presented a more inflexible and static system, while NTAS 
demonstrates a flexible and responsive system. The systems resided on polar ends of the 
trust and confidence level spectrum. HSAS inspired little trust and confidence; 
conversely, NTAS enjoys a sufficient level of trust and confidence. As a result of this 
qualitative analysis, NTAS is an effective warning system and provides sufficient 
decision advantage. However, NTAS does have detractors in the external constituent 
group. These detractors do wonder why alerts are not issued readily and conclude that 
NTAS is not functioning well. This stems more from a lack of understanding on the 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter includes the interpretations and conclusions distilled from this 
research effort. It presents a discussion of the research, its limitations, recommendations 
for future research and conclusions and/or recommendations for NTAS.  
A. DISCUSSION 
This research effort sought to answer two questions: How effective is the NTAS, 
when compared to its predecessor the HSAS. A secondary research question is: Does 
NTAS provide sufficient decision advantage for the nation it serves? This research 
examined the mechanics of a terrorism warning system to attain an improved 
understanding of how such a warning system functions effectively. This was achieved 
through validating or invalidating the hypothesis that the NTAS provides an improved 
system in support of CT decision making, coordination, and communication.  
B. LIMITATIONS 
This research remained limited to examining the United States use of terrorism 
warning systems over the past 13 years. As the current NTAS Coordinator, a clear 
limitation is the level of bias my position presents to any reader of this research.161 
Consideration of classification and handling restrictions for some of the research 
information presented another limitation. 
Clearly, my position affords me unparalleled access to the inner workings of 
NTAS and how it is utilized. It also provides me a unique perspective regarding the topic 
of decision advantage in using terrorism warning systems. It offers insight into why these 
decisions were made. However, this level of closeness to NTAS also generated a certain 
level of bias, which at times, made it difficult to balance with sufficient objectivity. The 
161 As noted on page 1, the author is the current NTAS Coordinator for DHS. In this role he works for 
the DHS CT Coordinator in the Office of the CT Coordinator. This office coordinates CT functions for the 
department and supports the DHS CT Coordinator in advising the DHS Secretary on CT issues and 
incidents. 
 77 
                                                 
academic rigor of the Naval Postgraduate School thesis process and the thesis advisory 
faculty proved to be invaluable in the mitigation of any bias. 
Maintaining the broadest extent of availability for this research presented the 
other challenge. Limiting the research to openly available information proved the biggest 
obstacle. Attaining official release of more sensitive information for this research was 
granted; however, utilizing this information incurred the cost of severely restricting 
access to it. After careful consideration, the benefits of including the sensitive 
information did not outweigh the costs of restriction. Additionally, the objectives of this 
research could be achieved without this sensitive information. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A deeper comparative analysis of terrorism warning system usage in the broader 
context of how the international community uses these systems would prove insightful. 
This type of study could serve to advance better understanding of the themes recognized 
in this research: functional effectiveness and decision advantage. This could validate the 
tenets of these warning systems derived from the literature review conducted in this 
research or reveal other principles not accounted for here. This research may also reveal 
trends in how other governments that face a greater frequency of terrorist attacks 
approach terrorism warning system usage. This would answer research questions, such 
as: “Are nations faced with a higher frequency of terrorist attacks more or less likely to 
issue warnings? If so, how broadly is this warning provided: the general public or only to 
public officials?” 
Conducting a survey of officials responsible for utilizing terrorism warning 
systems could validate the decision advantage conclusions from this research or advance 
discovery of other decision-making factors not considered. Since this survey would 
evaluate national level systems, this prompts the need to interview leaders from the 
international community who maintain such a system. In addition, a survey of officials 
who receive and act on warnings could provide an updated analysis regarding the value 
of these systems. This survey would involve officials from different levels of 
government, responsibility, or infrastructure sector within the HSE, such as state 
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homeland security advisors, mayors of major urban areas, county managers, or private 
sector leaders. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This research confirms that NTAS is a viable system, which effectively employs 
the terrorism warning system tenets noted in the literature review. NTAS is also a 
valuable tool in the strategic homeland security inventory for keeping this nation safe. It 
clearly provides a flexible option for communicating information related to terrorism. 
Unlike its predecessor HSAS, NTAS is not merely another form of static color-coded 
alerting. Instead, the system “advises” the public and other members of the HSE in a 
detailed manner on decisions they need to make and subsequent actions they should 
consider. Beyond its role as an advisory system, the NTAS process effectively supports 
strategic CT coordination within DHS and it incorporates every partner from within the 
HSE as the situation dictates. The combined decision making agility and execution 
authority, embodied in the DHS CT Coordinator and CTAB, is the fulcrum point for 
NTAS as well as the system’s greatest strength. It also continues to effectively position 
the federal government’s ability to implement the president’s guidance in PPD-7, 
“providing a system in which the American citizen can have confidence.”162 
The NTAS process provides improvement in coordinating CT efforts by 
supporting the DHS CT Coordinator and the DHS CTAB. The NTAS responsibly 
communicates information with HSE partners regarding terrorism incidents or other CT 
issues not inherently designed for public consumption like an NTAS generated public 
alert. This communication may occur through other products, such as JIB, etc.163 The 
NTAS process also maintains the capability to issue its own formal alert in order to 
provide timely detailed information, which is in keeping with the recommendations of the 
HSAC Task Force.  
162 Executive Office of the President, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-7. 
163 Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, Intelligence Guide, 29. 
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Although the NTAS remains a key capability for DHS, the members of the HSE, 
and the American public, improvements remain for this system. The following steps 
include recommended measures to ensure continued success of this capability: 
(1) Renew the DHS CTAB Charter or other appropriate governance 
documents, which ensure the necessary combined decision making and 
execution authority for NTAS. 
(2) Fulfill HSAC Task Force Recommendation 6 and formally establish an 
Office of Counterterrorism Coordination, which will provide necessary 
staffing and budgetary sustainability. This permanent office will ensure 
effective support for the CTAB as well as coordinate CT counter-measures 
and other CT related functions of the department, such as NTAS. 
(3) Refine the NTAS Concept of Operations to better demonstrate the 
system’s scalable outcomes other than a NTAS generated alert, such as 
Joint Intelligence Bulletins, Joint Threat Assessments, etc. 
(4) Continue to improve communication aspects of NTAS and integrate with 
other warning systems, such as the Integrated Public Alert and Warning 
System (IPAWS).164 
(5) Continue to conduct NTAS related outreach and education efforts with the 
HSE and the public. 
In closing, NTAS embodies the necessary teamwork aspect of homeland security 
also noted in the literature review. The following statement represents the vision of 
former DHS Secretary Napolitano regarding how NTAS also fosters a broader sense of 
teamwork, “As I said, this new National Terrorism Advisory System is built on the 
common-sense belief that we are all in this together, and that we all have a role to 
play.”165 Therefore, the NTAS and its process, lives up to this vision and effectively 
fulfills its role as an effective terrorism warning system. 
 
164 Damon Penn, Antwane Johnson, and Wade Witmer, “Integrated Public Alert & Warning System,” 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, September 20, 2013, https://www.fema.gov/integrated-public-
alert-warning-system  
165 Napolitano, “State of America’s Homeland Security Address.” 
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